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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(i)
(2009). By order dated April 27, 2010, this appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of
Appeals subject to the right of the parties to request that this Court retain the matter. This
Court subsequently vacated the prior order of transfer and elected to retain jurisdiction
over this appeal by order dated May 26, 2010.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellant, Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC ("Bear Hollow"), presents the following
issues:
1.

Did the Public Service Commission ("Comncjission") err in granting the

Respondent Summit Water Distribution Company's (" swic ") Motion to Dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction?
a.

Did the Commission err in dismissing Bear Hollow's Complaint and

Request for Agency Action ("Complaint") against Respondent S WDC when Bear Hollow
alleged SWDC operates a public utility, providing water service to the general public,
who are not SWDC shareholders, through the sale of shares? (Issue Preserved: R. 1:4-5;
12:2-6; 24:7-9.)
Standard of Review: This Court "grant[s] no particular deference to the [agency's]
legal conclusions" and "accept[s] the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
considers] them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in the light most
favorable to the [petitioner]." Adkins v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 926 P.2d 880, 882
(Utah 1996) (fifth alteration in original) (internal quotations bmitted).
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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b.

Did the Commission err in dismissing Bear Hollow's Complaint against

SWDC for lack of jurisdiction when the Complaint alleged that SWDC is not a bona fide
non-profit mutual culinary water company governed by those it serves but is instead
dominated and controlled by the Saunders/Knowles Respondents who are not consumers?
(Issue preserved: R.l:5; 12:6; 24:6.)
Standard of Review:

"When reviewing [an agency's] interpretation of general

questions of law/' including "rulings concerning an agency's jurisdiction or authority,"
this Court "applies a correction-of-error standard, granting no deference to [agency]
decisions." Blauer v. Dept. of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App 280, % 4, 167 P.3d 1102
(alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
2.

Did the Commission err in dismissing Bear Hollow's Complaint against the

Saunders/Knowles Respondents1 for lack of jurisdiction when the uncontested allegations
demonstrate that the individual non-consumer Respondents control, manipulate, and
operate SWDC as a vast, for-profit enterprise to the detriment and prejudice of Bear
Hollow and the remaining minority SWDC shareholders and consumers?

(Issue

Preserved: R.R.1:5; 11:1-8; 24:6-7.)
Standard of Review:

"When reviewing [an agency's] interpretation of general

questions of law," including "rulings concerning an agency's jurisdiction," this Court
1

The controlling shareholders of SWDC are Leon ("Hy") Saunders, Stuart A. Knowles,
and the entities either owned or controlled by Mr. Saunders and Mr. Knowles, including
Landmark Plaza Associates, Parley's Creek, Ltd., Parley's Lane, Ltd., Parley's Park,
Trilogy Limited, L.P., Trilogy Asset Management, Inc., Land & Water Resources, Inc.,
Lawrence R. Knowles Irrevocable Trust, and Leon H. Saunders, Stuart A. Knowles, and
Trilogy Limited, L.P. dba SK Resources, a Utah general partnership and/or joint venture
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Saunders/Knowles Respondents").
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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"applies a correction-of-eiror standard, granting no deference to [agency] decisions."
Blauer, 2007 UT App 280 at % 4 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
3.

Was Bear Hollow substantially prejudiced by the Commission's ruling,

which dismissed Bear Hollow's Complaint on the ground that the Commission does not
have jurisdiction over a culinary water company that serves twater only to the properties
owned by its shareholders, when the ruling is contrary to the Commission's prior practice
of asserting jurisdiction over such entities and constitutes d^ facto rule making? (Issue
Preserved: R.12:2-8; 24:3-5.)
Standard of Review:

"Whether a state administrative agency engaged in an

unlawful decision-making process is ... a question of law" that this Court reviews under a
correction of error standard. WWC Holding Co., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm fn, 2002 UT
23,1f26,44P.3d7l4.
4.

Did the Commission err in determining that B^ar Hollow could not amend

its Complaint to provide additional allegations supporting Commission jurisdiction when
the Amended Complaint was filed during the Request for Rebonsideration period? (Issue
Preserved: R. 24:9-10.)
Standard of Review: "When reviewing [an agency's] interpretation of general
questions of law," this Court "applies a correction-of-0rror standard, granting no
deference to [agency] decisions." Blauer, 2007 UT App 280 at f 4 (alterations in
original) (internal quotations omitted).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Bear Hollow attaches as Addenda to this Brief a copy of the following:
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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(A) Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 (2009);
(B) Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (2009);
(C) Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-301 (2009);
(D) Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (2009);
(E) Utah Admin. Code R746-100-3; and
(F) Utah Admin. Code R746-331-1 (repealed June 30, 2010).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case:
This is an appeal from the Commission's Order Dismissing Bear Hollow's
Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction against SWDC and those individuals
operating and controlling the "non-profit" SWDC for their personal gain and profit.
2. Course of Proceedings:
This appeal arises from the Complaint and Request for Agency Action (the
"Complaint") filed by Bear Hollow on September 10, 2009. (R. 1.) In its Complaint,
Bear Hollow, a minority shareholder of SWDC, requested that the Commission revoke
any exemption from regulation granted to SWDC pursuant to Administrative Rule R746331-1. (R. 1:23.) This request was based upon the fact that SWDC is not governed by
the consumers it serves but is controlled and operated by its controlling, non-consumer
shareholders, the Saunders/Knowles Respondents. The non-consumer Saunders/Knowles
Respondents dominate, control, and operate SWDC as a vast for-profit enterprise under
the guise of a nonprofit mutual water company. (R. 1:5-10.) Bear Hollow also requested
that the Commission commence an investigation to determine whether SWDC and the
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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*. iaunders/Knowles Respondents should be regulated as a for-profit public utility. (R
1:23-24.) Finally, Bear Hollow requested tl lat the Commission set "just and reasonable
rules, regulations, anu praeuces •..:-.

* ^-

• • ••

**'«

I lit* Kniindi.TS''Knowlrs Respondents. (R I \ } \ )
:.: [espouse, both SWDC and the Saunders/Knowles Respondents mover? *~
dismiss the Complaint on the ground that the Con imission lacke ci jui isdictioi
Specifically, SWIM1 rind Hie Saiiiiclers/Kiitni les Respondents} argued that SWDC did not
qualify as a "public utility" and was therefore not within the regulatory jurisdiction of the
Commission because it AcA not serve the public generally hut . ^ . ^ ^ s _
sliareluHi; »
which woui*

*
w

1 evoking the exempuuh ^ _lai = ns

Commission3 pursuant to Administrative R ule R^*,.

M

\ .

. * n ; * ha* 'e&

, : na\e lAeued "o*\
I i;iaii>

He

Saunders;know les Respond* ill1. "iilmuflnl out* additional aipiirii'iil MM1 'fin M'I i.p|n. i!

9

The Division of Public Utilities did not appear or otherwise take part in this matter.
There is no evidence that SWDC received such an exemption The Divisior of Public
Utilities made a recommendation to the Commission that SWDC1 k- exempt, bin ;he
record does not indicate that the Commission ever formally granted the exemption
4
R746-331-1 provides that a "mutual, non-profit corporation, furnishing culinary " vater"
may be granted :\r- exemptw% *"••• •*• < - >rmpi<Hon regulation if
•

:>

•fu: Commission finds that the entity is an existing non-profit corporation,
= u good standing with the Division of Corporations; that the entity owns or
rwise adequately controls the assets necessary to furnish culinary water
service to its members, including water sources and plant; and that voting
control of the entity is distributed in a way that each member enjoys a
complete commonalit} ' -nhM-i^t K a consumer, such that rate regulation
would be superfluous.
Utah Admin. Code R746-331 -1 C (repealed June 30, 2010).
1819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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to SWDC, cannot be regulated because the Saunders/Knowles Respondents, themselves,
do not own or control a water system sufficient to qualify as a public utility. (R.5:4-6.)
Responding to SWDC's and the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' claim that
SWDC does not qualify as a public utility, Bear Hollow referred the Commission to the
complaint filed by SWDC and many of the Saunders/Knowles Respondents pending in
the Third District Court (the "Anti-Trust Action"). In the Anti-Trust Action, SWDC,
Saunders, and Knowles alleged that they "are engaged in the retail sale of culinary water
that is then distributed and delivered by [SWDC] for commercial and residential use."
(R. 11:4-5.) Bear Hollow also explained that, due to the provisions in SWDC's articles
of incorporation and bylaws, which do not allow SWDC to select its members, SWDC is
serving the general public. (R. 12:3-4.)
With respect to SWDC's argument that its claimed R746-331-1 exemption should
not be revoked, Bear Hollow referred the Commission to the allegations within the
Complaint that reveal SWDC is not a bona fide non-profit corporation but is, in fact, an
unregulated for-profit utility designed to allow the Saunders/Knowles Respondents to
exploit the corporation's finite resources by selling shares (not backed by any water
supply or source) to the general public at inflated prices. (R. 12:5-8.)
Finally, responding to the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' argument that they did
not qualify as a "water corporation," Bear Hollow pointed to the statutory definition of
"water corporation," which includes any "person ... owning, controlling, operating, or
managing any water system for public service within this state." (R. 11:2.) As alleged in
the Complaint, the Saunders/Knowles Respondents have used their control of SWDC to
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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d o m i n a t e , u > 1111 <»I i •"" > 11.111111 M 11 < 111i 111i, i i >i11pai1 v' s operations for theii own personal gain.
Accordingly, Beai Hollow requested that the Commission deny the Saunders/Knowles
Respondents' motion to dismiss. (V
!iWIM "\" aiinl (lit Sauiiuk ts/tvtmw Irs hvspondrnls' motions to dismiss were heard
on December 8 '\):)K- -i <* xion-evidentiary hearing before Administrative Taw T*
Ruben H. Arredondo " (R. 28.xi The Commi^ion isM^o ^ Order o*
on Februarv i
and SWDC

. • '

*

:

u

.

\ -

J>

^nondents

'^ dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, t i< .: ; . !

vVIth respect to the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' motion. •*-.
erected an easilv eradicated
• »!

AI.IW

ounmsMon

.

• iw dial the Saunders/Knowles Respondents "control,

own, and manipulate and dominate" ~'AT'~ (R, 23:8.) The Commission then declared
that, as it is not a "court ot equity," it would not IK abk lu dclrrmine w liethei SWHi ' h
'ii lac' Hit1 Saiiiiil* rs Know |(, S l^f i^spi >I it II *II t S alter ego

(J U.) lliu^, a*c Commission

stated that it "was not the proper forum to remedy the substantive issues Bear Hollow
raises in its Complaint, as those are properly addressed in a ti lal emu I '' 11

1 I

1'iirmim In SWIM '"s motion, tlte ('nmmission ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over
J

Despite refusing to allow an investigation in this case, it is clear that the Commission
recognizes its authority and duty to conduct investigations to determine whether an entity
is subject to the Commission's jurisdiction given its recent order in In re Matter of the
Formal Comphn'tn of Nicole McMillia
Wilkinson Cottonwood Mutual Water
A1
Company. Docket No. 09-01°
dated I
v 22, 2010. (A copy of the February 22,
2010 Order is attached herein a.s \ddendn/n VJ / In that case, unlike in the present case,,
the Commission ordered an investigation to be conducted to determine "whether
[Wilkinson Cottonwood Mutual Water Company] serves those who are not members, and
could be considered members of the genera! public," (Id. at 2.)
4819-8039-5783/1 IA566-013
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SWDC because there were no allegations that SWDC provides water service to anyone
other than shareholders.

(R. 23:11.)

In so ruling, the Commission rejected Bear

Hollow's argument that SWDC has no ability to select who receives water service,
declaring, "so long as [SWDC] serves only its shareholders, it is not serving the public
generally." (R. 23:13.)

The Commission also ignored Bear Hollow's allegations that

SWDC serves the public generally through its service of water to rental homes, apartment
units, and public buildings, stating, "[t]he Commission does not agree that because such
shareholders in turn deliver water to general members of the public—i.e. customers,
patrons, tenants, etc., [SWDC] can then be considered a public utility." {Id.)
Furthermore, the Commission disregarded the admissions made by SWDC and
certain of the Saunders/Knowles Respondents in the ongoing Anti-Trust Action showing
that they are, in fact, engaged in the retail sale of water, declaring, "[e]ven if [SWDC]
markets it services, and even if it is the only provider in some areas its serves, there is no
allegation that [SWDC] serves anyone other than shareholders."6 (R. 23:14.) Finally,
despite its recognition that the "allegations that [SWDC] does not in fact operate as a
non-profit corporation[] raise[] some valid questions," (R. 23:15), the Commission held
that the determination of whether SWDC has "violated the laws governing non-profit
water corporations ... is a task for a trial court, not the Commission." {Id.)

6

It should be noted that it is impossible to accurately define SWDC's service area
because the Commission has never required SWDC to set forth its service area, despite
the fact that such a requirement is imposed upon all other public utilities. See, e.g., Utah
Admin. Code R746-405-1.B, C.4 (providing that each utility "shall have on file with the
Commission its current tariff," which includes "service area maps"). Indeed, this is one
of the basic duties of the Commission.
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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Scar departure from its prior exercise of
its jurisdiction o\ ei mutual,, non-profit culinary water companies and was contrary to
Rule R746-331-1 C and Utah law, Bntt Hollow died a lunch Request loi Reheat ifij." mi
Marcli "t, M\\i\

il'

" 1" '! » |

Tl ,• Ktu|nrst lor Rehearing pointed out that, because the

Commission did not follow the requirements ol tlu Uf, h ulministrative Rule Making
Act in reversing its "long-settled position reganln^ the scope *>\ us jurisdiction.,1" "I'R,
, ' 4 , 3 ) , ilii L u l U i i i r . M o l i

J hmiI* i l o i n l i l u t r d lA

'

> . . . ; .

( R.

24:3-.S.) Bear Hollow also explained that the Commission's refusal to investigate S Wl )C
to determine %\: *
mandate

' N operating .1 for profit scheme was contrary to thi- \ ym,-\

,.../,*. .
/. •: ••••+< * \t SWDC be "scrutinize! d! dosely to determine whether or not a certain

organization or method of conduct has for its purpose evasion of the law." (R. 24:6.)
Bear Hollow further noted dial roiil*-H •• '* Ili«." i Jnii»inssioii1i< ildcniiiiuiioii 'I •
<'omplamt fis on;;ui;ill\ plr •

«, .illott i factual allegations supporting jurisdiction,

including allegations that, jusi ^ L e Rocky Mountain Power or Questar, SWDC cannot
preclude a purchaser of property located within its area ol sei vn e Irom ieivn
> >r-

IIIJ»

i. ul n I«I v

^ e Commission determined, on rehearing, that the

Complaint laekoJ <u\ln i< iv pjnsdictioiul 11 legations, Bear Hollow requested that the
ComiiiKsSiOn

COn c

;wilu>,

.

:,

,1

iurisdir
Hollow's Request for Rehear :
On. March 29. ji,n.
1819 8039 - s i i< v-<-

•

J5

.\l:..Li.

and was filed concurrently with Bear

R. 24:9-10; 29.)
v omnu^ioii
9

V^ULC

;

,t- ..-c

-n* ; -

;

Obviously recognizing its failure to follow, and, indeed, its complete repudiation of, its
own jurisdictional rule, the Commission "note[d] that [it] filed a Notice of Proposed Rule
Repeal of Rule 746-331 ... on or about March 22, 2010," about one and one-half months
after the Commission issued its Order in this case. (R. 27:2.) Bear Hollow now appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

History of SWDC's Operations

SWDC was founded by Respondent Leon H. Saunders in March 1979 as a mutual,
non-profit culinary water company for the stated purpose of providing water service in
unincorporated western Summit County, Utah. (R. 1:4.) As set forth in its articles of
incorporation, SWDC's stock is divided into four classes: Class A (development) shares;
Class B (water use) shares; Class C (irrigation) shares; and Class D (snowmaking) shares.
(R. 1:13-14.) Unlike the remaining SWDC shareholders, Class A shareholders are not
consumers of water service provided by SWDC; rather, Class A shares are supposed to
be issued to developers upon the developer's conveyance to SWDC of sufficient water
rights and source site.7 (R. 1:14.) It is only after the developer sells a particular lot to a
customer that the Class A (development) share is convertible to a Class B (use) share.
(Id.)

The Class B share is then deemed appurtenant to and inseparable from that

particular lot, meaning that ownership of the water right represented by the Class B share
is transferred automatically upon transfer of the real property. (R. 1:14.)
Despite the fact that Class A shareholders are not consumers of any services

7

In reality, the vast majority of Class A shares are issued to the Saunders/Knowles
Respondents, who then market them to developers at high prices.
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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provided by -A"

'

'

^areholders have the same voting ruihts as Class B [use)

shareholders, with u . h ^hiuc Ivnnz entitled to one vote.
(irrigation) shareholder aini < u^» IJ ,'snowmaking) sharehoku:

(R. i J4 1 ^ N
...i\

Hasr* C
. n;.*r-.ts.

(R 1:1 5 ) \ccoi dingb ,'„ :)i 1I.3 " the Class \ ai id Class 13 shareholders are authorized to \ ote
for members of SWDC's Board of Directors, which governs SWDC and sets the general
assessments applicable to Class B, ('lass C, and Class I) shareholders.

(H I I I II") )

"'Hi! liir 111111 1 SWDC-i Inimalniii Ihi1 Snydemllr Basin \\\\n\i 1 lm atni in the
western end of Summit County, experienced phenomenal growth both from ivsni'l
developments and as a suburb of Salt Lake City. (R 1 m}0 ) \ s a result ot this growth,
water became ai.- - 1:. u >

<-

-. *"

»

tavern mental entity outside the corporate limits of Park City to provide culinary water
service, consumers were forced to obtain culinary water from private water companies
like S

* WRS agam* tins bat kdiop Hi.HI Saundei'. InitiinJ * i\VI )f!.
* *•

••'cdb founder, Saunders is also the President, a member of die

Board jf Directors, and the largest Class A shareholder of SWDC, (R 1:2.) Indeed, as
of l[>i)2

launders held, either personally or through •jilihe1; HWIII'I1

> * -ntr ollc I l]«\

""' Class A shares are general
»<• - i<:.. with two exceptions, L U . ^ \ MI ares may
be assessed "as needed" to iiMiuiani tlu- developer's specifically contributed water rights
ill good standing, and the shares may be subject to a special assessment or contract ehame
associated with the developed *s eonii ibuted water rights, (R 1115.)
;
During the past 15 years, many of these small private water compai
.came pan *>;
1" 1 loi intain Regional Water Special Service District, which was created u> summit Co^> 1*.
to provide culinary water necessary for the residents of Summit County. (R. 1:10.;
10
It should be noted that Bear Hollow, as a shareholder of SWDC, requested an updated
Shareholders' List from SWDC in 2009, but SWDC refused to provide the document in
violation of its duties under the Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation -v.r • R - ' «
1819-81';->-^<'HAS(..,.i: 1 •

11

him, 4,146.272 Class A (development) shares, representing 42.5% of all Class A shares
and 27.5% of all outstanding SWDC shares. (R. 1:6, 15.) In contrast, Saunders owned
only 1.5 Class B (use) shares. (R. 1:17.)
Joining forces with SWDC's second largest Class A shareholder, Saunders formed
a partnership or joint venture, known as SK Resources, with Respondent Stuart Knowles.
(R. 1:4.) Knowles, who is also a member of the SWDC Board of Directors, held as of
2002, either personally or through entities owned or controlled by him, 3,672.942 Class
A (development) shares, representing 37.6% of all Class A shares and 24.4% of all
outstanding SWDC shares. (R. 1:6, 15.) Together, as of 2002, Saunders and Knowles
owned or controlled 80.1% of all Class A shares and 51.9% of all outstanding SWDC
shares.

(R. 1:6.)

As the majority shareholders, Saunders and Knowles completely

control elections of SWDC's Board of Directors and all of its operations. (R. 1:16, 19.)
2.

SWDC's, Saunders' and Knowles' Retail Sales of Culinary Water

Despite the fact that SWDC purports to be a non-profit, mutual culinary water
company, Saunders and Knowles have used, and continue to use, their controlling interest
in SWDC to operate a wholly unregulated, vast, for-profit enterprise. (R. 1:5; 11, Ex. A:
8.) Through their unregistered entity known as SK Resources, Saunders and Knowles
have consistently and repeatedly "engaged in the retail sale of culinary water that is then
distributed and delivered by [SWDC] for commercial and residential use." (R. 1:6; 11,
Ex. A: 10.) Indeed, as shown by their Anti-Trust Action, Saunders and Knowles not only
concede that they use SWDC as a mechanism to obtain "a reasonable return on their
investment," (R.l 1, Ex. A:8), they boast that they "were the leading, largest and strongest
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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competitor for the retail sale, distribution and delivery of water in the Snyderville Basin"
1

as of January 2000. ^

•. F \ . A: 10 femph.^is added).)

i onipnnv, the admissions made in the Anti-Trust Action clearly demonstrate the breadth
of SWDC's conduct, as directed by Saunders and Knowles, in operating as a for-profit
enterprise, an enterprise seeking new customers chosen l:>> Saundei s and K no vv les

I • :>i

example. in the \ nti ' I n ist l\ :tion, Saunders and Knowles allege that "[SWDC],, together
• ?h i lass \ iMusim ^k-m.\holders [Saunders, Knowles. and others], compete in -ikoiWuuion, sale and distribution *•; . ..h'nary water

if

• \ :8 ) I he rele\ ant i nai ket ii i, \ <

» ^WDC Sai md»

the provision, service and saK

-t . ulnurv

;.„ -iivUcrvine liasm
'J- - •

v

*» * t. * '••nsn-1 ^

.- notable irrigation wate* \- -% ^ -

developments in the Snyderville Basin with each development representing a separate

"was intense and healthy, resulting in low prices to developers and water customers, and
enabling them., to select from... among the competitors in the Snyderville Basin based on
iiiifihiil hidikcl \ uiii|f*insu(Li» .in li ii i (mini , iihahililt. ICUUIUIIUIL IW^I, iiiJiiihttiiaUi n,\
water capacity, excess water capacity, and the like. \iam/
In addition, to competing against "private water companies subject to regulation by
illii

I iHiiiiiJs 1111mii

Regional

N VU N

Water Special

("Mountain Regional"),

S a u n d e r s 11111i I in i r - ilsi

i i m p d ! 1 I^MIHISI M o u n l iiiiiii

Service District, a quasi-municipal public
(R 11, Ex, A ; c

1A

1

"*N

corporation

T

~ order to win over at least one

ironically, the Commission has failed to ever delineate a service area for SWDC
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potential customer from Mountain Regional, SWDC aggressively marketed its product
and services, "promising to 'beat any competitors offer.'" (R. 11, Ex. A: 12.) Believing
that Mountain Regional has engaged in a series of conduct designed to "prevent or
severely limit [their] ability to compete for new water connections," SWDC, Saunders,
and Knowles filed their Anti-Trust Action, seeking to recover "compensatory damages"
for the injury to their "properties and business." (R. 11, Ex. A: 14, 46-47.)
It is not difficult to understand why Saunders and Knowles have gone to court to
attempt to stop Mountain Regional from interfering with their ability to continue to
engage in the sale of SWDC water to the public. Indeed, a review of the known sales
transactions consummated by Saunders and Knowles demonstrates that their retail sale of
SWDC's shares has been quite lucrative. Based on purchase agreements obtained by
Bear Hollow,

it is evident that SK Resources entered into at least 11 purchase

agreements between the years 1993 and 2002, in which SK Resources sold at least 733.06
Class A shares for a total price of over $6 million.13 (R. 1:6-8, Ex. E-O.)

Bear Hollow has been limited in its ability to obtain information regarding Saunders
and Knowles' sales transactions. Thus, although Bear Hollow has obtained copies of 11
separate purchase agreements, it believes that Saunders and Knowles have entered into
additional, as yet unknown, agreements with other consumers. Such a belief is more than
reasonable given the allegations contained in Saunders and Knowles' Anti-Trust Action
complaint, which describe SWDC, Saunders, Knowles, and a few other Class A
shareholders as "the leading, largest and strongest competitor for the retail sale,
distribution and delivery of water in the Snyderville Basin" as of January 2000. (R. 11,
Ex. A: 10 (emphasis added).)
13
Given that two of the purchase agreements contained options to purchase 78 additional
shares, Saunders and Knowles may have received more than $7.2 million for the known
sales transactions. (R. 1:6-8, Ex. E-O.) Despite the fact that Saunders and Knowles have
received substantial compensation through the sale of their shares, SWDC has not
reported the compensation to the Internal Revenue Service as required for SWDC's status
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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3.

Saunders- and Knowles9 Control and Manipulation of SWDC

~V-;pite selling a significant number of Class A shares, Saunders and Knowles
have continued to maintain their ii on gi ip o\ ei S VV DC ait id its opei ations. (R 1:8 ) I his
is due to the fact that Saunders and Knowles have caused SWDC to issue to them or to
their entities new" Class A shares, thereby allowing Saunders and Knowles to maintain
:

their majority ownership of SWDC despite their lucrative sales oi ;->naa..>. ..-.
*

<

manipulatioi

SWDC's operations to ensure that they will be able to continue to market, and profit ! • •
the retail sale of, SWDC water. {Id.)

of having no right to receive water at any given time because SWDC does not own or
otherwise adequately control the water assets necessary to furnish culinary water service
mi ill inn thuicholik i •» 11 I II I " 1 '

I II|I|M iirs lli.il! Ilit in'!. ( Ia%> A Jiati1. i-h-vtj J U

Saunders and Knowles to ensure their continued control of SWDC are not backed by the
contribution of water rights and water sources as mandated by SWDC's articles, (R

tfie

num ber

of shares at risk of receiving no water will continue to increase, while

Saunders' and K no wles' domination and control of SWDC remains the same.
SnuiiiluLs

iiml

k n u r l It s l i i u

iliii

mi! m l I In in I I mi mi mi I 11 I I I I I S \\ \ H

in

iiiilli

iiiiiii

competition from other SWDC Class A shareholders, such as Bear Hollow. (R. 1:22.)
They have done so by requiring purchasers of Class A shares to enter into "development
as a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit corporation (R 1:9.)
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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agreements" in which the Class A shares purchased will be deemed appurtenant to and
inseparable from the land. (R. 1:19, 21.) As a result, the shares held by Saunders and
Knowles, which are not subject to a location restriction, are more marketable and, hence,
more valuable. (R. 1:22.) Indeed, in their Anti-Trust Action, Saunders and Knowles
explain the value of their "unique" shares, stating,
The Investor Shareholders' Class A shares are unique in that they are not
dedicated to any specifically identified property development.
Consequently, the right to wet water that these shares represent may be sold
to new or existing Class A shareholders having an identified property
development interest.
This is the means by which the Investor
Shareholders' [sic] recover their costs and a reasonable return on their
investment in obtaining and developing the water rights and water sources
and providing the capital to construct the storage, distribution and delivery
systems they have contributed at no cost to [SWDC].
(R. 11, Ex. A:8.) Thus, Saunders and Knowles have, in fact, created two classes of Class
A shares—extremely valuable and fungible shares owned by Saunders and Knowles
and/or their entities, which are readily marketable and not tethered by appurtenancy to
any particular piece of land, and shares that cannot be sold because they are tethered to a
particular piece of land. (R. 1:21.) By creating such a distinction between Saunders' and
Knowles' Class A shares and the remaining Class A shares, Saunders and Knowles have
created a monopoly or a near-monopoly on the sale of Class A shares.

(R. 1:22.)

Consequently, Saunders and Knowles are able to sell SWDC water, a valuable and
essential public resource, at whatever prices they dictate. (R. 1:22.)
4.

SWDC's Claimed Rule R746-331-1 Exemption

SWDC claims that, in 1989, the Commission granted it a letter of exemption from
regulation as a public utility in accordance with Rule R746-331-1.C, which provided,
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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[i]f, on the basis of the information elicited, the Commission finds that the
entity is an existing non-profit corporation in good standing with the
Division of Corporations; that the entity owns or otherwise adequately
controls the assets necessary to furnish culinary water service to its
members, including water sources and plant; and that voting control of the
entity is distributed in a way that each member enjoys a complete
commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be
superfluous, then the Commission shall issue its finding that the entity is
exempt from Commission jurisdiction ....
Utah Admin. Code R746-331-l.C (repealed June 30, 2010). (R. 6:1.)
However, after receiving requests from entities suph as Summit County that
SWDC's exemption be reevaluated, the Division of Public Utilities ("DPU") conducted
an investigation in 2002 to determine whether SWDC qualified for an exemption from
regulation under R746-331-l.C. (R. 6:1, Ex. A.) The DPU issued its findings on August
2, 2002, and recommended that the exemption remain in place. (R. 6, Ex. A.) This
recommendation was based on the following findings:
The Division did not see any evidence of control by Class A shareholders.
At the present time there are approximately 2,800 Cla$s B shares issued and
about 5,000 Class A shares issued. Unlike most mutual water companies
within Utah, the developers' shares in SWDC are not held by a single
developer. They are held in varying numbers by several different
individuals and entities. The largest single Class A shareholder has only
1,300 shares, meaning that it would require collusion of the part of three or
more Class A shareholders to pass any resolution against the wishes of the
Class B shareholders.
(Id. at 2, 3.)
Within less than three months after this recommendation, however, Saunders and
Knowles caused SWDC to issue to them or to their entities an additional 2,800 Class A
shares. (R. 1:8-9.) Thus, contrary to the DPU's findings, Saunders and Knowles actually
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owned or controlled 81% of Class A shares and more than 50% of all outstanding SWDC
shares, thereby ensuring that, through the cooperation of just Saunders and Knowles, they
would be able to outvote the interests of all other SWDC shareholders.14 (R. 1:8-9, 15.)
5.

Bear Hollow as a Class A Shareholder

On June 2, 1998, Bear Hollow's predecessor in interest, Bear Hollow Village
("BHV"), purchased 260 Class A (development) shares from Saunders and Knowles in
anticipation of developing approximately 175 acres in Summit County. (R. 1:19.) Using
their ownership and control over SWDC's operations, Saunders and Knowles required
BHV to sign a Development Agreement in which the shares it purchased from Saunders
and Knowles would be designated appurtenant to and inseparable from the development
property. (R. 1:19-20.) As the development neared completion, Bear Hollow discovered
BHV had been required to purchase more shares than needed to service the development.
(R. 1:20.) Accordingly, Bear Hollow requested that SWDC authorize a transfer of the
surplus shares. (R. 1:20.) SWDC has repeatedly denied the request. (Id.)

Without

SWDC's authorization, Bear Hollow will be unable to sell the surplus shares. (Id.)
Recognizing the disparity of treatment between Saunders and Knowles and the
remaining SWDC shareholders, Bear Hollow petitioned the Commission to evaluate
whether SWDC qualifies for an exemption under Rule R746-331-1 and to review the

14

The fact that Saunders and Knowles are able to control the outcome of all shareholder
votes is apparent from a review of SWDC's Board of Directors from 2001 to 2009, which
shows very little change in the composition of the Board. (R. 1:16-17.) It should be
noted that the only officer and director holding a Class B (use) share during the period of
2001 to 2009 was Saunders, with 1.5 shares. Each of the remaining officers and directors
owned only Class A (development) shares. (R.l :17.)
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rules and regulations of SWDC to protect against discriminatory treatment of SWDC's
minority shareholders and consumers. (R. 1: 23-24.) Because Saunders, Knowles, and
their related entities have actively manipulated and controlled the operations of SWDC
for their own profit and to the detriment of the remaining shareholders and consumers,
Bear Hollow also asked the Commission to determine whether the Saunders/Knowles
Respondents should likewise be subject to jurisdiction. (R. l;24-25.) Without reviewing
the substance of any allegations, however, the Commission d0clared it lacked jurisdiction
even "to commence an inquiry ... at this time" based on its conclusion that SWDC and
the Saunders/Knowles Respondents do not qualify as a public utility. (R. 23:14.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The position urged by SWDC and the Saunders/fKjiowles Respondents and
adopted by the Commission below is that a utility providing Essential public services can
escape all regulation and oversight, from both the Commission and its own consumers,
simply by claiming that its services are delivered solely to nominal shareholders, who
have no actual ability to control or affect change in th^ operations of the utility.
However, such a position is contrary to the very purpose of the Utah Legislature's
creation of the Commission and the longstanding principle articulated by this Court in
Garkane. Accordingly, this Court should (1) reverse the Commission's ruling that it
lacked jurisdiction over SWDC; (2) reverse the Commis$ion's ruling that it lacked
jurisdiction over the Saunders/Knowles Respondents; (3) iiold that the Commission's
failure to comply with its prior interpretation of jurisdiction and Rule R746-331-1
constituted de facto rule making; and (4) hold that the Commission's conclusion that
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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Bear Hollow could not file an amended complaint during the reconsideration period is
erroneous as a matter of law.
First, the Commission's conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
SWDC is erroneous in several respects. In reaching its conclusion, the Commission
disregarded the multi-factor test of "public utility" set forth by this Court in Garkane and
instead held that one factor, i.e., whether SWDC served only its shareholders, was
dispositive to its determination of jurisdiction. As a result of applying only part of the
test, the Commission ignored several key facts that demonstrate that SWDC is a public
utility subject to regulation, such as the fact that SWDC's membership is open to the
general public, SWDC engages in the retail sale of water to non-shareholders, and SWDC
provides water to the general public.
Moreover, the Commission also erred in refusing to comply with this Court's
mandate that it scrutinize the substance of SWDC's operations to determine whether
SWDC is, in fact, operating as a bona fide cooperative or is instead operating as a forprofit scheme to the detriment of its minority shareholders/consumers. Because the facts
alleged in Bear Hollow's Complaint demonstrate that Saunders and Knowles have
manipulated, controlled, and operated SWDC as a for-profit enterprise, the Commission
erred in dismissing Bear Hollow's Complaint against SWDC.
Second, the Commission likewise erred in concluding that it could not assert
jurisdiction over Saunders and Knowles. In refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the
Saunders/Knowles Respondents, the Commission ruled that a shareholder is not subject
to regulation simply by owning shares in water corporation. However, in so ruling, the
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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Commission failed to consider the fact that Saunders and Knowles are not merely
shareholders but are, in fact, the individuals manipulating, controlling, and operating
SWDC for their own personal gain. The Commission also tailed to consider Saunders'
and Knowles' own admissions in their Anti-Trust Action, ih which they unequivocally
state that they are personally engaged in the "retail sale of| culinary water that is then
distributed and delivered" by SWDC. These facts clearly demonstrate that Saunders and
Knowles "own[], control[], operate[], or manag[e] a water system" and therefore qualify
as a public utility under the provisions of the Utah Code.
Moreover, even if the Saunders/Knowles Respondents do not qualify as a public
utility, the Commission is nonetheless authorized to exercise jurisdiction over them to the
extent that they have engaged in conduct violative of thq statutes governing public
utilities or have aided or abetted SWDC in engaging in siich conduct. Because Bear
Hollow's Complaint alleged that Saunders and Knowles have caused SWDC to violate
several statutory provisions, it was error for the Commission to determine that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the Saunders/Knowles Respondents.
Third, the Commission's ruling is invalid because it constitutes de facto rule
making. As recognized by this Court, an agency cannot revlerse its long-settled position
regarding the scope of its jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy change without
following the requirements of the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act. Prior to this
case, the Commission consistently held, in accordance with Rule R746-331-1, that it has
jurisdiction over mutual nonprofit culinary water companies serving only their
shareholders.

However, in the proceedings below, the Commission reversed this
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longstanding interpretation of its jurisdiction without complying with the Administrative
Rule Making Act. Although the Commission attempted to validate its changed position
by repealing Rule R746-331-1 after issuance of its ruling in this case, such an attempt to
retroactively comply with the Rule Making Act is improper. Accordingly, this Court
should hold that the Commission's ruling, which represents a departure from its longsettled interpretation of jurisdiction, is invalid.
Finally, the Commission erred in holding that Bear Hollow was not permitted to
amend its Complaint during the period for rehearing. It is a well-settled principle that
administrative pleadings should be liberally construed and easily amended. Moreover, it
is also well-settled that a petition for rehearing filed with an agency extends the date on
which the agency decision becomes final. Given the fact that Bear Hollow filed its
Amended Complaint concurrently with its Petition for Rehearing, the Commission had
the authority to review the Amended Complaint. Because the Commission erroneously
held that Bear Hollow could not amend its Complaint, its ruling should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Commission Erred in Granting SWDC's Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction

The Commission has the "power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every
public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utility
in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (2009). Section 54-2-1 defines "public utility" to
include "every ...water corporation ..., where the service is performed for, or the
commodity delivered to, the public generally." Id. § 54-2-1 (16)(a).

4819-8039-5783/HA566-013

22

Selectively focusing on the phrase "where the service is performed for, or the
commodity delivered to, the public generally," the Commission ruled that it lacked
jurisdiction to even conduct an investigation into the operations of SWDC "so long as
[SWDC] serves only its shareholders." (R. 23:12, 13.) However, as discussed below,
such a ruling is erroneous given that Bear Hollow has alleged that (A) SWDC operates as
a public utility and markets its water services to the general public, and (B) SWDC is not
a bona fide non-profit mutual water company but is instead Operating as a vast for-profit
scheme for the benefit of its controlling shareholders. Accordingly, the Commission's
ruling should be reversed, and the cause should be remanded for further proceedings.
A.

The Commission erred in dismissing Bear Hollow's Complaint
alleging that SWDC operates as a public utility and provides
water service to the general public through the sale of shares
/. The Commission's Order Is Contrary to the Holding ofGarkane

Bear Hollow's allegations clearly demonstrate that SWDC should be regulated as
a public utility; accordingly, the Commission erred in dismissing Bear Hollow's
Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Many y^ars ago, in Garkane Power
Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 100 P.2d 571 (Utah 1940), this Court determined what
constitutes service of the "public generally" sufficient to Qualify an entity as a public
utility for purposes of Commission jurisdiction. It declared, "[t]he test ... is ... whether
the public has a legal right to the use which cannot be gainsaid, or denied, or withdrawn,
at the pleasure of the owner." Id. at 573 (alterations in original) (internal quotations
omitted). Indeed, "[t]he essential feature of a public use is that it is not confined to
privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public1 It is this indefiniteness or
4819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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unrestricted quality that gives it its public character." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
This Court recognized that, in a true cooperative governed by those it serves,
regulation is superfluous, stating, "there is no need for regulation of true cooperatives"
given that "[tjhere is no conflict of consumer and producer interests—they are one and
the same." Id. Indeed, because, in a true cooperative, the "owner is both seller and
buyer," it matters not how many members belong to the cooperative "[s]o long as [the]
cooperative serves only its owner-members and so long as it has the right to select those
who become members!' Id. (emphasis added).
Noting that the Garkane cooperative was organized "by a group of consumers,"
that it limited service to only its members, and that it reserved power to accept or reject
any individual as a member, id. at 572-73, the Court ultimately held that Garkane, "a
nonprofit electric cooperative which serves only its members, and is completely
consumer owned with each consumer limited to one membership, is not a public utility
within the purview of [the] statute."15 Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
As would be expected, for many years the Commission complied with Garkane.
It even codified the multi-factored analysis required by Garkane by promulgating Rule
R746-331-1. This rule assured that the Garkane factors would be used to determine

15

It should be noted that the holding in Garkane, as applied to electrical utilities, was
subsequently superseded by an amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1. See Utah Code
Ann. § 54-2-1 (16)(b)(ii) ("If a[n] ... independent energy producer not described in
Subsection (16)(d), or electrical corporation sells or furnishes gas or electricity to any
member or consumers within the state, for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, for
which any compensation or payment is received, it is considered to be a public utility,
subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title.").
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whether a mutual culinary water company such as SWDC is, in fact, operating in such a
manner as to render regulation superfluous. The rule provided:
[i]f, on the basis of the information elicited, the Comhiission finds that the
entity is an existing non-profit corporation, in good standing with the
Division of Corporations; that the entity owns or otherwise adequately
controls the assets necessary to furnish culinary water service to its
members, including water sources and plant; and that voting control of the
entity is distributed in a way that each member enjoys a complete
commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be
superfluous, then the Commission shall issue its finding that the entity is
exempt from Commission jurisdiction....
Utah Admin. Code R746-331-1.C (emphasis added) (repealed June 30, 2010).
Thus, complying with its obligation set forth in Garfcane to "scrutinize closely"
each purported non-profit mutual culinary water company to insure that its operations are
consistent with its form and to protect each of its members, the Commission required
more than a superficial showing that the water company delivers water to only its
shareholders. Rather, to qualify for an exemption under Rule R746-331-1.C, the mutual
culinary water company was required to show that it is a non-profit entity, that it owns
adequate assets to furnish the culinary water service, and that its voting control is
distributed so that each member enjoys a complete commonality of interests.
However, in this matter, the Commission ignored Garkane and abandoned its own
rule.

Discarding both the commonality of interest and the adequacy of assets

requirements, among others, it held that a single factor was dispositive to its
determination of jurisdiction—whether SWDC delivered water solely to its shareholders.
Indeed, the Commission declared that "[ajbsent any allegation that would factually allege
that [SWDC] serves those who are not shareholders, the Commission cannot assert
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jurisdiction—even for an investigation, and must dismiss." (R. 23:12.) Based on this
improperly narrowed interpretation of Garkane, the Commission concluded that it was
without jurisdiction to address any of the substantive claims alleged by Bear Hollow.
However, had the Commission followed Garkane and applied its own administrative rule
based on Garkane, it would have concluded that SWDC is subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction and should be regulated as a public utility because, inter alia, (a) membership
in SWDC is, in fact, open to the general public; (b) SWDC, through its controlling
shareholders, engages in the retail sale of water to non-shareholders; and (c) SWDC
provides water to non-shareholder members of the general public.16
a. Membership in SWDC Is Offered to the General Public
As noted above, in determining whether Garkane served the general public, this
Court relied heavily upon the fact that membership in the cooperative was restricted to
those selected by the cooperative's Board and/or members. Garkane, 100 P.2d at 572,
573 (holding that number of members in a cooperative is irrelevant "[s]o long as a
cooperative serves only its owner-members and so long as it has the right to select those
who become members" (emphasis added).). Unlike in Garkane, however, SWDC does
not have the power or ability to select those who may become consumer shareholders.
First, the Saunders and Knowles entities hold large blocks of Class A shares, which they
are free to sell to anyone they choose. Indeed, if their allegations in their ongoing AntiTrust Action are to be believed, Saunders and Knowles actively market their shares to the

16

A finding of any one of the three above-described factors is fatal to SWDC's claim that
it is not a public utility subject to regulation.
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general public. Unlike in Garkane, neither the Board nor the shareholders of SWDC
have any say in who Saunders and Knowles sell shares to.
Furthermore, because SWDC's Class B (use) shares are "appurtenant to and
inseparable from the lot" upon which such water is used, (R. 1:14), any member of the
general public has the right to become a shareholder of, ^nd to receive service from,
SWDC simply by purchasing property to which an SW1])C share has already been
dedicated. Once a member of the general public has purchased such property, SWDC
cannot arbitrarily interfere with the right to receive wat^r, nor can it preclude the
purchaser from receiving ownership of the water right appurtenant to the lot. See In re
Johnson's Estate, 11% P. 748, 751 (Utah 1924) ("[0]wners^iip of shares of stock in the
corporation is but incidental to ownership of a water right. S^ich shares are muniments of
title to the water right, are inseparable from it, and ownership of them passes with the title
which they evidence."). Thus, SWDC has no authority or ability to limit membership in
its organization but instead must hold open membership in its organization to any
individuals who purchase shares from Saunders and Kndwles or, more importantly,
members of the general public who purchase property (and, thus, appurtenant Class B
(use) shares) within its service district.17 Accordingly, SWI^C services are available and
provided to the public generally.
In rejecting Bear Hollow's allegations that SWDC's services are available to the
general public due to SWDC's inability to limit or selept those who may become
It should be noted that in some areas of the Snyderville Basin served by SWDC, like
Jeremy Ranch, SWDC is the only water service provider. Thus, residents in those areas
have no choice but to receive SWDC's water service.
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shareholders and consumers, the Commission noted that SWDC still "retain[s] the power
to reject anyone that is not willing to meet the requirements imposed on shareholders"
and then concluded that, "[e]ven if the requirements are minimal, so long as [SWDC]
serves only its shareholders, it is not serving the public generally." (R. 23:13.) In so
ruling, however, the Commission failed to recognize that the ability to deny service to a
member of the general public who is not willing to pay assessments or meet other
requirements is not equivalent to the power to limit admittance into SWDC to a select
and privileged few, as required by Garkane. Because SWDC cannot refuse to accept any
individuals or entities that have purchased or will purchase property (with appurtenant
Class B (use) shares) within its service district, SWDC is no different than any other
public utility that is required to serve residents within its service district. While both may
require consumers to agree to abide by certain rules and regulations, neither may refuse
or withdraw service at its pleasure, which, as Garkane held, is essential to avoiding
classification as a public utility. 100 P.2d at 573. As SWDC has no power to refuse
membership to a purchaser of property with appurtenant Class B (use) shares within its
service district, SWDC is, in fact, open to the indefinite public and therefore qualifies as a
public utility.

Thus, the Commission erred in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over

SWDC.
b. SWDC, through Saunders and Knowles, Engages in the Retail
Sale of Culinary Water to the General Public
Bear Hollow also alleged that SWDC's own admissions in the Anti-Trust Action
regarding its active role as a competitor in the retail water market establishes that SWDC
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is a public utility marketing its services to the general public. (R. 12:5.) Indeed, Bear
Hollow pointed to statements made in the Anti-Trust Action, such as the statement that
SWDC competes with Mountain Regional for the "retail sale, distribution and delivery of
new water connections to developers and property owners" and the statement that
Saunders and Knowles, through the sale of their shares, "are engaged in the retail sale of
culinary water that is then distributed and delivered by [SWDC] for commercial and
residential use," (R. 11, Ex. A:8, 12), which clearly demonstrate that, unlike in Garkane,
SWDC is marketing its water to members of the general public.
Again relying on its improperly narrow interpretation of Garkane, the
Commission rejected Bear Hollow's claim that SWDC is subject to jurisdiction because it
markets its water to the general public, declaring "[e]ven if [SWDC] markets its services,
and even if it is the only provider in some areas it serves^ there is no allegation that
[SWDC] serves anyone other than shareholders." (R. 23:14.) However, such a ruling is
directly contrary to the Garkane holding.
In Garkane, this Court addressed a concern raised by the Commission that
Garkane may attempt to sell its power to nonmembers at some point in the future. 100
P.2d at 573. This Court responded by declaring, "[t]o the argument that Garkane may at
some future time become an investment business venture and sell power to nonmembers
the answer is: when such change occurs it will be time enough for the Commission to
take jurisdiction and to regulate its activities." Id.
Based upon SWDC's, Saunders', and Knowles' adinissions in their Anti-Trust
Action, it is clear that the potential conduct that concerned the Court in Garkane has
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occurred and continues to occur in this case. SWDC is, in fact, a for-profit business
venture as illustrated by the very existence of the Anti-Trust Action and its allegations
that the "Investor Shareholders" sell their "unique" Class A SWDC shares as a means to
obtain a "reasonable return on their investment." (R. 11, Ex. A:8.) Moreover, it cannot
be contested that Saunders and Knowles are selling SWDC water to non-shareholders
based upon their own allegations that, "[tjhrough the sale of their Class A shares, the
Investor Shareholders are engaged in the retail sale of culinary water that is then
distributed and delivered by [SWDC] for commercial and residential use."18 (R. 11, Ex.
A:8.)

Indeed, it is through such retail sales to non-shareholders that Saunders and

Knowles have been able to pocket millions of dollars. Because the Commission failed to
consider such allegations and instead focused solely on SWDC's "form," the
Commission erred as a matter of law.
c. SWDC Provides Water to Non-Shareholder Members of the
General Public
Even under the Commission's improperly narrowed application of the Garkane
holding, the Commission should have found there were sufficient allegations to support
jurisdiction over SWDC. For example, Bear Hollow alleged that SWDC does not limit
its service of culinary water to shareholders only but instead serves the general public.
Relying on the shareholder list attached to its Complaint, Bear Hollow pointed out in its
Although the purchasers of Saunders' and Knowles' shares may eventually become
SWDC shareholders after complying with SWDC's policies regarding the transfer of
shares, it cannot be argued that the purchasers are shareholders at the time of their
purchase. To the contrary, Saunders and Knowles are selling their shares to those who
are not shareholders but desire to become so. Thus, the sale of culinary water is made to
non-shareholders.
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response to SWDC's motion to dismiss that non-shareholders who rent or lease houses
and apartments within SWDC's service district, including Canyon Creek Apartments and
those renting timeshare resorts from Circle J Club, receive water service from SWDC.19
(R. 12:4.) Because the water service is delivered directly to the tenants or lessees of the
properties, Bear Hollow asserted that SWDC is delivering its water to "the public
generally." (R. 28:33.)
The Commission rejected Bear Hollow's allegations that SWDC serves the
general public through its service of culinary water to lessees of apartments and other
properties located within SWDC's service district, declaring, "[njone of these contentions
allege that anyone other than shareholders directly receive service from [SWDC]." (R.
23:13.) However, such a ruling fails to consider the allegations in a light most favorable
to Bear Hollow, as the Commission was bound to do.

Had the Commission done so, it

could only have concluded it is reasonable to infer that non-shareholder renters receive
water service directly from SWDC and pay for their individual services, such that "the
service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally." Utah
Code Ann. § 54-2-l(16)(a) (defining "public utility"). By failing to provide Bear Hollow
with the benefit of such reasonable inferences and the opportunity of confirming those
inferences through discovery, the Commission erred, and its Order dismissal of Bear

19

It should also be noted that SWDC provides water service to public facilities, including
the Park City School District and the U.S. Post Office. (R. 12:4.)
20
See Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, \ 9, 104 P.3d 1226
(providing that, in reviewing motion to dismiss, trial court shall accept factual allegations
in complaint as true "and interpret those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party.?).
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Hollow's Complaint should therefore be reversed.
//. The Commission *s Order Is Contrary to Statute
In addition to the fact that the Commission's narrowed and restricted view of a
"public utility" is contrary to the holding in Garkane, the Commission's ultimate
conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over any water company that delivers water solely to
its shareholders is also contrary to the express language of the statutes defining the
Commission's jurisdiction. As defined in Section 54-2-1, a "water corporation" is "every
corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling,
operating, or managing any water system for public service within this state. It does not
include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their
stockholders ...." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(29) (emphasis added). Similarly, a "water
system" is defined to exclude "private irrigation companies engaged in distributing
water only to their stockholders" Id. § 54-2-l(30)(b) (emphasis added).
"When interpreting a statute, [this Court] look[s] first to its plain language to
determine its meaning." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 304, f 11, 169 P.3d 778.
"While examining a statute's plain language, [the Court] do[es] so under the presumption
that the legislature used each term advisedly." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Indeed,
It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if
possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.... No clause [,]
sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if
the construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the
words of the statute.
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
According to the Commission's interpretation, no private water company serving
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only its shareholders would ever qualify as a public utility.

However, such an

interpretation renders portions of Sections 54-2-1(29) a^id 54-2-1(30) superfluous.
Because a water corporation is, by definition, an owner, controller, or operator of a water
system providing public service in Utah, the Legislature's specific and express exclusion
from the definition of water corporation all "private irrigation companies engaged in
distributing water only to their stockholders" would be unnecessary and superfluous if,
indeed, the Commission is correct in its conclusion that delivery of water to shareholders
is not providing a "public service." Moreover, the Legislature's exemption granted solely
to "private irrigation companies" would likewise be superfluous if, as interpreted by the
Commission, private culinary water companies serving only their shareholders are
automatically excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction.
Clearly, by creating an exception solely for "private irrigation companies engaged
in distributing water only to their stockholders," the Legislature demonstrated its
intention that private culinary water companies serving only their shareholders are
providing a public service and, thus, subject to Commission regulation.
The Commission's failure to properly apply both Gar\kane and Section 54-2-1 has
caused substantial prejudice to Bear Hollow in that Bear Hbllow has been denied a full
and fair consideration of the issues it presented to the Cotnmission. See Commercial
Carriers v. Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 888 P.2d 707, 713 ( P a h Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that test for substantial prejudice "is whether [the petitioner] was given full and fair
consideration of the issues"). Accordingly, Bear Hollow is entitled to relief from the
Commission's Order as provided by Section 63G-4-403. Ske Utah Code Ann. § 63G-44819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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403(4)(d) ("The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced" by an agency's erroneous interpretation or application of the law).
B.

The Commission erred in refusing to consider Bear Hollow's
allegations that SWDC is not a bona fide non-profit mutual
culinary water company but is instead a for-profit investment
scheme designed to benefit Saunders and Knowles

Even if the Commission's determination that it has no jurisdiction over culinary
water companies that serve only shareholders is correct, the Commission nonetheless
erred by failing to examine the substance of SWDC's operations. As noted above, the
Commission has the "power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility
in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in this state."
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (2009). As defined by Section 54-2-1, a public utility includes
"every ...water corporation ..., where the service is performed for, or the commodity
delivered to, the public generally." Id. § 54-2-l(16)(a).
The Commission ruled that it lacked power to even conduct an investigation into
the operations of SWDC, despite the uncontested allegations that the Saunders/Knowles
Respondents have controlled and manipulated the operations of SWDC to convert it into
a vast, for-profit moneymaking scheme, solely because SWDC delivers water only to its
shareholders. However, such a ruling disregards this Court's mandate in Garkane.
In Garkane, this Court recognized that the purpose of public utility regulation is to
protect consumers who otherwise have no say in the rates and operations of the public
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utility from which they receive service.

Thus, to avoid regulation, a bona fide

cooperative must have internal controls within the cooperative that ensure the interests of
the consumers are protected. Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573. These internal controls include
facts such as "[t]here is no conflict of consumer and producer interests—they are one and
the same," "[i]f rates are too high the surplus collected is returned to the consumers pro
rata," and "[i]f service is not satisfactory the consumer-members have it in their power to
elect other directors and demand certain changes." Id. But this Court also recognized
that not all entities formed as a "cooperative" are in fact operating as such. Therefore, the
Court held that substance should prevail over form such that I the entity should always be
"scrutinize^] closely to determine whether or not ... [it] has for its purpose evasion of
the law."22 Id.
Eschewing its responsibility to scrutinize the substance of SWDC's operations to
determine whether SWDC is, in fact, controlled by the consumers it serves or is instead

21

Nor are the same consumers able to exercise the right of choice as there is typically
only one option for natural gas, electric or, in this case, water service.

99

Thus, while municipal utilities and true cooperatives are not subject to regulation, as
those they serve control the utility provider either through municipal or Board elections,
other utilities are subject to regulation. For example, a resident of Salt Lake City receives
gas service from Questar, a regulated public utility, since it is investor owned and
controlled, and water service from the non-regulated municipal utility, Salt Lake City
Water Department, since residents of the City have the right to vote for the utility's
governing board, i.e., the City Council.
The Commission's ruling in this matter violates this longstanding principle. If
allowed to stand, it would create, for the first time, an unregulated public utility that is
not answerable to those consumers it serves. It could also lead to other now-regulated
utilities calling those they serve nominal shareholders, by issuing non-voting shares, and
thus escaping any regulation by the Commission or control by those they serve, leaving
the unregulated public utility free to provide essential public service on whatever cost,
terms, or conditions it pleases, exactly as SWDC is doing.
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operating as a for-profit moneymaking scheme, the Commission dismissed Bear
Hollow's Complaint without conducting any investigation into the operations of SWDC
or even considering the substance of Bear Hollow's allegations. Indeed, despite noting
that "[t]he allegations that [SWDC] does not in fact operate as a non-profit corporation^
raises some valid questions," (R. 23:15), the Commission ruled that the determination of
whether SWDC "has violated the laws governing non-profit water corporations ... is a
task for a trial court, not the Commission." (R. 23:15.) In so ruling, the Commission
ignored Garkane and relied solely upon the language of this Court in Sierra Club v. Utah
Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 960.
However, a review of the language upon which the Commission relied
demonstrates that Sierra Club does not support the Commission's refusal to consider the
actual operations of SWDC. In Sierra Club, this Court was tasked with determining the
appropriate standard of review to be applied to an agency's ruling on standing. Noting
that, "[a]s a court, we are in a better position than an agency to determine whether this
doctrine has been properly interpreted and applied, just as we are in a better position to
review questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation," the Court held an
agency's decision on standing should be reviewed for correctness. Id. at ^ 13.
It appears that the Commission has interpreted Sierra Club's holding as
prohibiting it from rendering a decision in the first instance on certain questions, such as
the question of whether SWDC is operating as a for-profit entity.

But such an

interpretation is unreasonable and cannot be countenanced by this Court. The Sierra
Club opinion does not limit the authority of an agency to decide questions in the first
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instance; rather, it merely sets forth the standard of review to be applied to those
decisions. Clearly, by setting forth the appropriate standard of review of an agency's
decision, Sierra Club implicitly recognizes that agencies have authority to, and, in fact,
should, rule upon those questions essential to the agency's purpose and jurisdiction.
Had the Commission done so in this case, it would have discovered that the
uncontested allegations set forth in the Complaint detail how Saunders and Knowles have
transformed a nonprofit mutual culinary water company into a vast, unregulated
moneymaking scheme.

Indeed, it is uncontested that Saunders and Knowles have

personally received over $6 million from what they term "the retail sale of culinary water
that is then distributed and delivered by [SWDC] for commercial and residential use."
(R. 11, Ex. A:8.) It is also uncontested that Saunders and Knowles have maintained
control over SWDC despite sales of their Class A shares, thereby ensuring that no SWDC
consumers will ever have the power or ability to effect change in either the composition
of SWDC's Board of Directors or its policies and rate-making processes. (R. 1:16.)
Because these factual allegations more than sufficiently support Bear Hollow's
claim that SWDC is, in substance, a for-profit entity marketing its culinary water for
retail sale within the Snyderville Basin, the Commission should have asserted jurisdiction
over SWDC pursuant to the holding of Garkane. See Garkahe, 100 P.2d at 573 ("To the
argument that Garkane may at some future time become an investment business venture
If the Commission's interpretation of Sierra Club were accepted, the administrative
process of all Utah agencies would essentially reach a stand-still. All agencies would be
required to await a court's ruling on standing, jurisdiction^ and many other threshold
questions before the agency could proceed. Such a result is Contrary to considerations of
judicial efficiency and the fundamental purposes of administrative agencies.
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and sell power to nonmembers the answer is: when such change occurs it will be time
enough for the Commission to take jurisdiction and to regulate its activities."). By failing
to do so, the Commission erred as a matter of law. Because Bear Hollow has been denied
the opportunity of a full and fair consideration of the issues as a result of the
Commission's error, see Commercial Carriers, 888 P.2d at 713, Bear Hollow is entitled
to relief from this Court pursuant to Section 63G-4-403.

Accordingly, this Court should

reverse the Commission's Order and remand the cause for further proceedings.
II.

The Commission Erred by Dismissing Bear Hollow's Complaint
against the Saunders/Knowles Respondents for Lack of Jurisdiction in
the Face of Allegations that Saunders and Knowles Control,
Manipulate, and Operate SWDC as a Vast, For-Profit Enterprise to
the Detriment and Prejudice of Bear Hollow and the Remaining
Minority SWDC Shareholders and Consumers

The Commission also erred when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address
the substantive issues raised by Bear Hollow regarding the conduct of the
Saunders/Knowles Respondents, in which the Saunders/Knowles Respondents are
alleged to have manipulated and dominated the operations of SWDC to exploit SWDC's
limited resources for their own personal gain.

The extent of the Commission's

jurisdiction is broad, as set forth in Section 54-4-1 of the Utah Code. Pursuant to that
section, the Commission has the "power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every
public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utility
in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1. A public utility is defined to include "every ...
water corporation ... where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to,
the public generally." Id. § 54-2-l(16)(a).
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"every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling,
operating, or managing any water system for public service Within this state." Id. § 54-21(29). A water system, in turn, is broadly defined to include:
all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, headgates, pipes, flumes, canals,
structures, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal
property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to
facilitate the diversion, development, storage, supply, distribution, sale,
furnishing, carriage, appointment, apportionment, or measurement of water
for ... municipal, domestic, or other beneficial use.
Id. § 54-2-l(30)(a).
In refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the Saunders/Knowles Respondents, the
Commission ruled that merely owning an interest in SWDC was not sufficient to qualify
the controlling shareholders as owning or controlling a "water system" for purposes of
Section 54-2-1 and that, as a result, the Saunders/Knowles Respondents did not qualify as
a public utility. (R. 23:6-7.) However, in so ruling, the Cotnmission failed to recognize
that the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' own admissions establish that they are, in fact,
much more than owners; they are operating and controlling a water system.
Indeed, in it undisputed that Saunders and Knowlfes represented to the Third
District Court that, "[t]hrough the sale of their Class A shaites, [they] are engaged in the
retail sale of culinary water that is then distributed and delivered by [SWDC] for
commercial and residential use." (R. 11, Ex. A:8.) Although Bear Hollow could recite a
number of other similar statements peppered throughout th^ complaint in the Anti-Trust
Action, it is unnecessary to do so because this statement alone demonstrates that the
Saunders/Knowles Respondents meet each of the requirements necessary to qualify as
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owning, controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service within
this state. Indeed, the statement establishes that the Saunders/Knowles Respondents use
their ownership and control of their stock, which represents an interest in real property,
Salt Lake City Corp, v. Cahoon & MaxfieldIrr. Co., 879 P.2d 248, 252 (Utah 1994), as a
means of engaging in the retail sale of culinary water that is then distributed to
commercial and residential users. Thus, the Class A shares owned and controlled by the
Saunders/Knowles Respondents to facilitate the retail sale and subsequent distribution of
water qualify as part of a water system.
If there were any doubt that the Saunders/Knowles Respondents operate a water
system, such a doubt should be removed in light of the following admission set forth in
the Anti-Trust Action: "[SWDC], together with Class A Investor shareholders, compete
in the production, sale and distribution of culinary water in the Snyderville Basin." (R.
11, Ex. A:8 (emphasis added).) This admission makes clear that the Class A Investor
shares are an integral part of SWDC's water system and that the Saunders/Knowles
Respondents have used their ownership and control over those shares to engage in the
retail sale of culinary water to the general public. Accordingly, the Saunders/Knowles
Respondents fall within the statutory definition of a "water corporation" and, as such,
should be subject to the regulations of the Commission.
In addition to alleging that the Saunders/Knowles Respondents have used their
personal ownership over "unique" Class A shares to engage in the "production, sale and
distribution of culinary water in the Snyderville Basin," (R. 11, Ex. A:8), Bear Hollow
also alleged that jurisdiction over the Saunders/Knowles Respondents is proper because
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the Saunders/Knowles Respondents have used their controlling interest in SWDC to
dominate and manipulate the operations of SWDC for their own personal gain.
For example, in its Complaint, Bear Hollow alleges that "SWDC is a non-profit
organization in form only.

In substance, SWDC and [the Saunders/Knowles]

Respondents operate a vast, for-profit enterprise controlled and orchestrated by [the
Saunders/Knowles Respondents]." (R. 1:5 at ^ 25 (emphasis added).) Additionally, the
Complaint alleges that, "[t]ogether, Saunders and Knowles 6wn and/or control 80.1% of
all Class A shares and 5L9% of all outstanding shares" and tltat
[I]t appears that immediately after the DPU made ife recommendation to
the Commission that SWDC not be regulated, based, in part, on the
assumptions that only 5,000 Class A shares had been issued and that it
would take unlikely collusion between Class A shareholders to warrant
regulation, SWDC immediately issued at least 2,819 more Class A shares
to Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles Entities so that
Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles Entities could,
once again, manipulate and dominate SWDC.
(R. 1:6 at % 26; 1:9 at % 44.)
The Complaint also describes how the Saunders/Knowles Respondents use their
control of SWDC to ensure their ability to engage in the retail sale of their shares, stating,
Saunders and Knowles, the Saunders and Knowle$ Entities, and/or SK
Resources' manipulation of SWDC's rules, regulations, and practices
prohibiting or refusing the transfer of the Class A (development) share to
the Buyer arbitrarily and unreasonably results in the creation of at least two
classes of Class A shares—extremely valuable and fungible shares owned
by Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles Entities, which
are readily marketable and not tethered to any particular piece of land
within the Snyderville Basin, and worthless and unusable shares owned by
parties such as Bear Hollow, which cannot be s0ld because they are
tethered to a particular piece of land that does not nee<tl them.
(R. 1:21 at % 119.) It is through their creation of this sub-cla&s of "unique" shares that the
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Saunders/Knowles Respondents have been able to "compete in the production, sale and
distribution of culinary water in the Snyderville Basin." (R. 11, Ex. A:8.)
Ignoring the substance of Bear Hollow's allegations that the Saunders/Knowles
Respondents have dominated, controlled, and manipulated the operations of SWDC for
their own personal gain, the Commission refused to exercise jurisdiction over the
Saunders/Knowles Respondents, contrary to its obligations pursuant to Section 54-7-21.
Section 54-7-21 of the Utah Code specifically empowers the Commission with the
responsibility of enforcing the laws governing public utilities. See Utah Code Ann. § 547-21 (2009). Such enforcement powers extend to agents, officers, and employees of
public utilities. Indeed, Section 54-7-26 sets forth a penalty for "[e]very officer, agent, or
employee of any public utility who violates or fails to comply with, or who procures,
aids, or abets any violation by any public utility of any provision of the Constitution of
this state or of this title ...." Id § 54-7-26 (2009). And Section 54-7-28 further extends
jurisdiction to "[e]very person who, either individually, or acting as an officer, agent, or
employee of a corporation other than a public utility, violates any provision of this title
... or who procures, aids, or abets any public utility in its violation of this title." Id. § 547-28 (2009).
Clearly, the allegations of Bear Hollow's Complaint assert that Saunders and
Knowles, either as officers of SWDC or as agents of Saunders and Knowles' partnership,
SK Resources, have either engaged in conduct violative of the statutes governing public
utilities or have aided or abetted SWDC in engaging in such conduct. For example, the
Complaint alleged that Saunders and Knowles have created a sub-class of Class A shares
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to eliminate competition for the sale of their shares. (R. 1:21.) Such conduct, in which
the Saunders/Knowles Respondents are provided with an advantage to the detriment of
the remaining shareholders, is expressly prohibited by Section 54-3-8. See Utah Code
Ann. § 54-3-8(1) (2009) ("[A] public utility may not ... ^s to rates, charges, service,
facilities or in any other respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any
person, or subject any person to any prejudice or disadvantage ....").
The Complaint also alleges that, due to their highly "marketable" shares and
eliminated competition, Saunders and Knowles have sold SWDC Class A shares at
"whatever prices they dictate." (R. 1:22.) Because it is reasonable to infer that such
prices are unreasonable and are ultimately passed on to the consumer as a connection or
hook-up fee, the fees charged by Saunders and Knowles for the "sale and distribution of
culinary water," (R. 11, Ex. A:8), are in violation of Section 54-3-1. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-3-1 (2009) ("Every unjust or unreasonable charge made> demanded or received ... is
hereby prohibited and declared unlawful.").
Additionally, the attachments to Bear Hollow's Complaint show that Saunders and
Knowles have set varying prices for their Class A Shares, ranging from $4,500.00 per
share to $15,000.00 per share. (R. 1:6-8.) Given Saunders' and Knowles' admissions in
their Anti-Trust Action that they have, in at least one instance, promised to "beat any
competitors offer," (R. 11, Ex. A: 12), it is apparent that the prices charged by Saunders
and Knowles for the sale of culinary water to be delivered by SWDC is not based upon
any reasonable basis but is instead simply dictated by Saunders' and Knowles' whim. As
such, Saunders and Knowles have aided or abetted in SWD(£'s violation of Section 54-34819-8039-5783/HA566-013
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8. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8(l)(b) (providing that a public utility may not "establish
or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service or facilities").24
Finally, Bear Hollow has alleged that Saunders and Knowles have caused SWDC
to issue them additional Class A shares to ensure their continued control over the
company and that SWDC now lacks water sufficient to cover each of the shares issued.
(R. 1:8, 12-13.) Indeed, the Complaint alleged that as many as two-thirds of all issued
SWDC shares are at risk of having no right to receive water at any given time. (R. 1:1213.)

Such conduct clearly constitutes a violation of Section 54-3-l's mandate that

"[e]very public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such service, instrumentalities,
equipment and facilities as will promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of
its patrons." Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1.
The fact that Bear Hollow's Complaint alleges Saunders and Knowles have
engaged in conduct in violation of the statutes applicable to public utilities or have caused
SWDC to do so requires the Commission to investigate the allegations and "promptly
prosecute[]" any violations. Id. § 54-7-21.

Accordingly, the Commission erred in

It should be noted that the Commission ruled that Bear Hollow's allegations regarding
the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' control over SWDC "is used to lead the
Commission to intercede in issues involving corporate governance, shareholder disputes,
contractual disputes, business torts, etc. Issues such as these (although they may have
merit) which do not involve the provision of service affecting consumer interest, or other
areas typically under Commission jurisdiction, are not within the Commission's
jurisdiction to remedy." (R. 23:9.) However, as discussed above, discriminatory
treatment among shareholders is expressly included within the Commission's
jurisdiction. Moreover, the prices charged by Saunders and Knowles for their "unique"
Class A shares are, in fact, rates paid by the consumers in the form of a connection or
hook-up fee. Thus, the conduct of Saunders and Knowles falls squarely within the
Commission's jurisdiction and should therefore be addressed by the Commission.
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refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the Saunders/Knowles Respondents to determine the
validity of Bear Hollow's allegations. As this error deprive^ Bear Hollow of a full and
fair consideration of the issues presented, Bear Hollow has been substantially prejudiced
and is therefore entitled to relief from this Court. Therefor^, Bear Hollow requests that
this Court reverse the Commission's Order dismissing Bear jHollow's Complaint against
the Saunders/Knowles Respondents and remand for further proceedings consistent with
the Commission's duties to investigate and prosecute all violations of Title 54.
III.

The Commission's Conclusion that It Lacked Jurisdiction because
SWDC Delivers Water Solely to its Shareholders Is Contrary to the
Commission's Prior Practice and Constitutes de facto Rule Making

The Commission's Order constitutes a clear change in the Commission's
interpretation of its jurisdiction over mutual, non-profit culinary water companies;
therefore, the Order constitutes de facto rule making and is accordingly invalid for failure
to comply with formal rule making procedures.

In Williams v. Public Service

Commission, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), this Court sqt forth the rule that "the
Commission cannot reverse its long-settled position regarding the scope of its jurisdiction
and announce a fundamental policy change without following the requirements of the
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act." Id. at 777.
On April 6, 1998, the Commission enacted Rule R74^-331-l, entitled "Conditions
for Finding of Exemption." That rule provided that, "[u]pon the Commission's own
motion, complaint of a person, or request of an entity desiring a finding of exemption, the
Commission may undertake an inquiry to determine whether an entity organized as a
mutual, non-profit corporation, furnishing culinary water, is outside the Commission's
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jurisdiction." Utah Admin. Code R746-331-1.A (repealed June 30, 2010). Essential to
the determination that a mutual, non-profit culinary water company is outside the
Commission's jurisdiction were the following three findings:

(1) the culinary water

company is a non-profit water company in good standing with the Utah Division of
Corporations; (2) the culinary water company owns or controls assets necessary to
furnish culinary water service; and (3) the voting control of the entity is distributed in a
way that each member enjoys a complete commonality of interest, as a consumer, such
that rate regulation would be superfluous. Id. R746-331-1.C.
In interpreting this rule and its statutory grant of jurisdiction, the Commission has
consistently (until recently) held that culinary water companies serving only their
shareholders are within its jurisdiction absent a demonstration of all of the factors set
forth in R746-331-1.C.25 For example, In re Petition for and Order to Show Cause
Regarding Exemption from Commission Regulation of Boulder King Ranch Estates
Water Company, Docket No. 02-2254-01, Amended Report and Order, issued Oct. 16,
2002, attached hereto as Addendum H, in response to Boulder King's claim that it was
not a public utility because it served only its shareholders, the Commission held:
Boulder King claims that because it is a nonprofit corporation which serves
only its owning members with each lot having one vote, that it is not a
"public utility." We disagree. Boulder King falls within the definition of a
Although the Utah Legislature has excluded "private irrigation companies engaged in
distributing water only to their stockholders," Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(30)(b), the
Legislature has not provided a similar exemption for private culinary water companies.
Given the Legislature's refusal to extend the statutory exemption to private culinary
water companies, the Commission has (until recently) consistently and properly
interpreted its jurisdiction to include non-profit, mutual water companies "furnishing
culinary water." Utah Admin. Code R746-331-1 .A.
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public utility. It is a water corporation that owns, controls, operates, or
manages a water system for public service within this state. The fact that it
is a nonprofit corporation owned by the owners of lots in the Boulder Kings
Ranch Estates subdivision does not cause it to be exeitatpt from regulation.
The statutes set forth above that define "water corporation" and "water
system" do exempt from regulation systems engaged in distribution of
irrigation water to their stockholders. There is no similar exemption for
culinary systems.
(Addendum H at 3 (emphasis in original).)26
In this case, it appears that the Commission has applied the exemption found in
Section 54-2-1 (3 0)(b) for "private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water
only to their stockholders" in finding that it does not have jurisdiction over SWDC.
However, that exemption is not applicable because, as in Bdulder King, SWDC is not a
"private irrigation company" but is instead furnishing culinary water.

Given the

Commission's prior interpretation of its jurisdiction over culinary water companies, as
clearly articulated in Boulder King and set forth in its administrative rule R746-331-1, the
Commission's departure from that interpretation here constitutes de facto rule making
and should therefore be reversed. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h) (providing that
an agency action that is either "contrary to a rule of the agency" or "contrary to the
agency's prior practice" is a ground for relief).
It should be noted that, after the Commission issued its Order in this case, it filed a
The Commission also (until recently) interpreted its jurisdiction to include officers and
individuals controlling a water corporation, such as is alleged in this case against the
Saunders/Knowles Respondents. For example, the Commission issued Orders to Show
Cause to officers of water corporations operating without a certificate of convenience.
Seet e.g., Docket No. 04-2436-01, Notice of Hearing and Order to Show Cause, issued
August 3, 2004, attached hereto as Addendum I. Thus, the Commission's determination
that it cannot exercise control over the Saunders/Knowles Respondents is likewise
contrary to its prior interpretation and, therefore, constitutes de facto rule making.
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Notice of Proposed Rule Repeal of Rule 746-331 with the Utah Department of
Administrative Services. (R. 27:2.) However, the Commission's attempt to comply with
the Rule Making Act after it issued its Order in this case cannot retroactively validate its
invalid Order. Because the Commission did not comply with the Rule Making Act prior
to issuing its Order in this case, the Order constitutes de facto rule making and is invalid
pursuant to this Court's holding in Williams.
By failing to properly apply its own Rule R746-331-1 .C, which was in effect at the
time Bear Hollow's Complaint was filed and at the time the Commission entered its
Order in this case, the Commission deprived Bear Hollow of a full and fair consideration
of the issues presented. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 63G-4-403(4), Bear Hollow is
entitled to relief from this Court. Bear Hollow therefore requests that this Court reverse
the Commission's Order and hold that, pursuant to the Commission's prior interpretation
of Section 54-4-1 and Rule R746-331-1, the Commission has jurisdiction over the
Respondents sufficient to commence an investigation to determine whether Respondents
meet all the requirements of R746-331-1 to qualify for an exemption from regulation.
IV.

The Commission Erred in Refusing Bear Hollow's
Complaint during the Request for Reconsideration Period

Amended

Finally, the Commission erred in rejecting Bear Hollow's Amended Complaint
during the Request for Rehearing period.

It is well recognized that, "[generally,

administrative pleadings are to be liberally construed and easily amended." Pitcher v.
Dep yt of Social Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983).

To that end, Rule R746-100-3

provides that the Commission "may allow pleadings to be amended or corrected at any
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time," and that "[i]nitiatory pleadings may be amended without leave of the Commission
at any time before a responsive pleading has been filed or the time for filing the pleading
has expired." Utah Admin. Code R746-100-3.D. Ignoring its own Rule and relying on
Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976), the Commission held that Bear Hollow's
Amended Complaint, filed concurrently with its Request for Rehearing, was not
authorized and should therefore not be considered.

(]R. 27:1.)

However, the

Commission's interpretation of Nichols misstates the law and is erroneous.
In Nichols, the plaintiffs complaint was dismissed on February 5, 1975. Id. at
232. Nearly eleven months later, plaintiff moved the court for leave to amend the
complaint. Id. Noting that the plaintiff did not file a timely Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)
Motion, the Utah Supreme Court held that the district court! was without jurisdiction to
entertain the motion, declaring "Utah has adopted the majjority rule that an order of
dismissal is a final adjudication, and thereafter, a plaintiff may not file an amended
complaint. After an order of dismissal, the plaintiff must move under Rules 59(e) or
60(b) to reopen the judgment." Id.
Unlike in Nichols, Bear Hollow filed a timely Request for Rehearing, which had
the effect of "extending] the date on which the agency decision bec[omes] final." Blauer
v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App 280, H 9, 167 Pl3d 1102 (internal quotations
omitted) (second alteration in original). It was concurrent with its Request for Rehearing
and prior to any responsive pleading that Bear Hollow p0titioned the Commission to
consider the Amended Complaint "[i]n the event the Commission determines, on
rehearing, that Bear Hollow's Complaint lacks sufficient allegations to support a finding
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of jurisdiction." (R. 24:9.) Because Bear Hollow's Amended Complaint was filed within
the statutory period for rehearing, during which the Commission retained jurisdiction
over the case, the Commission was authorized to consider the Amended Complaint.
Had the Commission considered the Amended Complaint, it would have allowed
Bear Hollow to cure any perceived technical defects in its pleadings without prejudicing
SWDC or the Saunders/Knowles Respondents. Moreover, consideration of the Amended
Complaint would have conserved judicial resources by allowing the issues presented in
this case, both substantive and jurisdictional, to be heard at the same time rather than in
two largely duplicative and repetitive cases. Finally, consideration of the Amended
Complaint may have mooted the necessity of the present appeal.
The Commission's error in holding that Bear Hollow was precluded from filing an
amended pleading during the period of reconsideration has deprived Bear Hollow of the
opportunity of a full and fair review of the substantive issues presented before the
Commission. Accordingly, Bear Hollow is entitled to relief from this Court, and it
requests that this Court remand for consideration of Bear Hollow's Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
The allegations presented to the Commission show that SWDC is operated as a
vast, unregulated, for-profit scheme controlled and directed by Saunders and Knowles.
Under Utah law, the Commission's duty is to assure that SWDC's consumers are
adequately protected. Because the Commission neglected its duty in this case, its ruling
should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings before the
Commission.
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DATED this \L

" day of August, 2010.
SMITH HARTVIGSEN,

PLLC

smith
i&J.
KathrynfJrSfeffey
Attorneys for Petitioner Bear Hollow
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this \ £ ^ day of August, 2010,1 caused to be served,
via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the BRIEF OF
APPELLANT BEAR HOLLOW RESTORATION, LLC addressed as follows:
David Clark
Public Service Commission
160 East 300 South, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John S. Flitton
Lara A. Swenson
Flitton & Swenson
1840 Sun Peak Drive, Suite B-102
Park City, Utah 84098
Attorneys for Respondent Summit Water Dist. Co.
Brent O. Hatch
Mitchell A. Stephens
Hatch, James & Dodge, P.C.
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for the Saunders/Knowles Respondents
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ADDENDA
(A)

Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 54-2-1;

(B)

Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 54-4-1;

(C)

Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 63G-3-301;

(D)

Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 63G-4-403;

(E)

Utah Admin. Code R746-100;

(F)

Utah Admin. Code R746-331;

(G)

In the Matter of the Formal Complaint of Nicole McMillian et al vs.
Wilkinson Cottonwood Mutual Water Company, Docket No. 09-019-01,
Order;

(H)

In the Matter of the Petition for and Order to Show Cause Regarding
Exemption from Commission Regulation of Boulder King Ranch Estates
Water Company, Docket No. 02-2254-01, Amended Report and Order; and

(I)

In the Matter of the Investigation of the Water System Operations of
DANIELS SUMMIT ESTATES WATER COMPANY for Certification
As a Public Utility or Exemption as a Mutual Water Company, Docket
No. 04-2436-01, Notice of Hearing and Order to Show Cause.
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Tab A

U.C.A. 1953 § 54-2-1
Westfs Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
Chapter 2. Definitions (Refs & Annos)
•*§ 54-2-1. Definitions

As used in this title:

(1) "Avoided costs" means the incremental costs to an electrical corporation of electric
energy or capacity or both which, due to the purchase of electric energy or capacity or
both from small power production or cogeneration facilities, the electrical corporation
would not have to generate itself or purchase from another electrical corporation.

(2) "Cogeneration facility":
(a) means a facility which produces:
(i) electric energy; and
(ii) steam or forms of useful energy, including heat, which are used for industrial,
commercial, heating, or cooling purposes; and
(b) is a qualifying cogeneration facility under federal law.
(3) "Commission" means the Public Service Commission of Utah.

(4) "Commissioner" means a member of the commission.

(5)(a) "Corporation" includes an association, and a joint stock company having any
powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships.
(b) "Corporation" does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts,
improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any
general or special law of this state.
(6) "Distribution electrical cooperative" includes an electrical corporation that:
(a) is a cooperative;
(b) conducts a business that includes the retail distribution of electricity the cooperative
purchases or generates for the cooperative's members; and
(c) is required to allocate or distribute savings in excess of additions to reserves and
surplus on the basis of patronage to the cooperative's:
(i) members; or

(ii) patrons.
(7) "Electrical corporation" includes every corporation, cooperative association, and
person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing
any electric plant, or in any way furnishing electric power for public service or to its
consumers or members for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, within this state,
except independent energy producers, and except where electricity is generated on or
distributed by the producer solely for the producer's own use, or the use of the producer's
tenants, or for the use of members of an association of unit owners formed under Title 57,
Chapter 8, Condominium Ownership Act, and not for sale to the public generally.

(8) "Electric plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned,
controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the production,
generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of electricity for light, heat, or power,
and all conduits, ducts, or other devices, materials, apparatus, or property for containing,
holding, or carrying conductors used or to be used for the transmission of electricity for
light, heat, or power.

(9) "Gas corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and
receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any gas plant for public service
within this state or for the selling or furnishing of natural gas to any consumer or
consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, except in the
situation that:
(a) gas is made or produced on, and distributed by the maker or producer through, private
property:
(i) solely for the maker's or producer's own use or the use of the maker's or producer's
tenants; and
(ii) not for sale to others;
(b) gas is compressed on private property solely for the owner's own use or the use of the
owner's employees as a motor vehicle fuel; or
(c) gas is compressed by a retailer of motor vehicle fuel on the retailer's property solely
for sale as a motor vehicle fuel.
(10) "Gas plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned,
controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the production,
generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of gas, natural or manufactured, for
light, heat, or power.

(11) "Heat corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and
receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any heating plant for public
service within this state.

(12)(a) "Heating plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, machinery, appliances, and
personal property controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the
production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of artificial heat.
(b) "Heating plant" does not include either small power production facilities or
cogeneration facilities.
(13) "Independent energy producer" means every electrical cdrporation, person,
corporation, or government entity, their lessees, trustees, or receivers, that own, operate,
control, or manage an independent power production or cogeneration facility.

(14) "Independent power production facility" means a facility that:
(a) produces electric energy solely by the use, as a primary eiiergy source, of biomass,
waste, a renewable resource, a geothermal resource, or any combination of the preceding
sources; or
(b) is a qualifying power production facility.
(15) "Private telecommunications system" includes all facilities for the transmission of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, messages, data, or other information of any nature
by wire, radio, lightwaves, or other electromagnetic means, excluding mobile radio
facilities, that are owned, controlled, operated, or managed by a corporation or person,
including their lessees, trustees, receivers, or trustees appointed by any court, for the use
of that corporation or person and not for the shared use with or resale to any other
corporation or person on a regular basis.

(16)(a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, g&s corporation, electrical
corporation, distribution electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative,
telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation,
heat corporation, and independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d),
where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally,
or in the case of a gas corporation or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is
sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial,
or industrial use.
(b)(i) If any railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telephone
corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat
corporation, or independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d),
performs a service for or delivers a commodity to the public, it is considered to be a
public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title,
(ii) If a gas corporation, independent energy producer not described in Subsection
(16)(d), or electrical corporation sells or furnishes gas or electricity to any member or
consumers within the state, for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, for which any
compensation or payment is received, it is considered to be a public utility, subject to the
jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title.

(c) Any corporation or person not engaged in business exclusively as a public utility as
defined in this section is governed by this title in respect only to the public utility owned,
controlled, operated, or managed by the corporation or person, and not in respect to any
other business or pursuit.
(d) An independent energy producer is exempt from the jurisdiction and regulations of
the commission with respect to an independent power production facility if it meets the
requirements of Subsection (16)(d)(i), (ii), or (iii), or any combination of these:
(i) the commodity or service is produced or delivered, or both, by an independent energy
producer solely for the uses exempted in Subsection (7) or for the use of state-owned
facilities;
(ii) the commodity or service is sold by an independent energy producer solely to an
electrical corporation or other wholesale purchaser; or
(iii)(A) the commodity or service delivered by the independent energy producer is
delivered to an entity which controls, is controlled by, or affiliated with the independent
energy producer or to a user located on real property managed by the independent energy
producer; and
(B) the real property on which the service or commodity is used is contiguous to real
property which is owned or controlled by the independent energy producer. Parcels of
real property separated solely by public roads or easements for public roads shall be
considered as contiguous for purposes of this Subsection (16).
(e) Any person or corporation defined as an electrical corporation or public utility under
this section may continue to serve its existing customers subject to any order or future
determination of the commission in reference to the right to serve those customers.
(f)(i) "Public utility" does not include any person that is otherwise considered a public
utility under this Subsection (16) solely because of that person's ownership of an interest
in an electric plant, cogeneration facility, or small power production facility in this state if
all of the following conditions are met:
(A) the ownership interest in the electric plant, cogeneration facility, or small power
production facility is leased to:
(I) a public utility, and that lease has been approved by the commission;
(II) a person or government entity that is exempt from commission regulation as a public
utility; or
(III) a combination of Subsections (16)(f)(i)(A)(I) and (II);
(B) the lessor of the ownership interest identified in Subsection (16)(f)(i)(A) is:
(I) primarily engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; or
(II) a person whose total equity or beneficial ownership is held directly or indirectly by
another person engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; and
(C) the rent reserved under the lease does not include any amount based on or determined
by revenues or income of the lessee.
(ii) Any person that is exempt from classification as a public utility under Subsection
(16)(f)(i) shall continue to be so exempt from classification following termination of the
lessee's right to possession or use of the electric plant for so long as the former lessor
does not operate the electric plant or sell electricity from the electric plant. If the former
lessor operates the electric plant or sells electricity, the former lessor shall continue to be
so exempt for a period of 90 days following termination, or for a longer period that is
ordered by the commission. This period may not exceed one year. A change in rates that

would otherwise require commission approval may not be effective during the 90-day or
extended period without commission approval.
(g) "Public utility" does not include any person that provides financing for, but has no
ownership interest in an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration
facility. In the event of a foreclosure in which an ownership interest in an electric plant,
small power production facility, or cogeneration facility is transferred to a third-party
financer of an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility,
then that third-party financer is exempt from classification as a public utility for 90 days
following the foreclosure, or for a longer period that is ordered by the commission. This
period may not exceed one year.
(h)(i) The distribution or transportation of natural gas for use as a motor vehicle fuel does
not cause the distributor or transporter to be a "public utility," unless the commission,
after notice and a public hearing, determines by rule that it is in the public interest to
regulate the distributers or transporters, but the retail sale alone of compressed natural gas
as a motor vehicle fuel may not cause the seller to be a "public utility."
(ii) In determining whether it is in the public interest to regulate the distributors or
transporters, the commission shall consider, among other things, the impact of the
regulation on the availability and price of natural gas for use as a motor fuel.
(17) "Purchasing utility" means any electrical corporation that is required to purchase
electricity from small power production or cogeneration facilities pursuant to the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. Section 824a-3.

(18) "Qualifying power producer" means a corporation, cooperative association, or
person, or the lessee, trustee, and receiver of the corporation, cooperative association, or
person, who owns, controls, operates, or manages any qualifying power production
facility or cogeneration facility.

(19) "Qualifying power production facility" means a facility that:
(a) produces electrical energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source, of biomass,
waste, a renewable resource, a geothermal resource, or any combination of the preceding
sources;
(b) has a power production capacity that, together with any other facilities located at the
same site, is no greater than 80 megawatts; and
(c) is a qualifying small power production facility under federal law.
(20) "Railroad" includes every commercial, interurban, and other railway, other than a
street railway, and each branch or extension of a railway, by any power operated,
together with all tracks, bridges, trestles, rights-of-way, subways, tunnels, stations,
depots, union depots, yards, grounds, terminals, terminal facilities, structures, and
equipment, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property of every kind used in
connection with a railway owned, controlled, operated, or managed for public service in
the transportation of persons or property.

(21) "Railroad corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees,
and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any railroad for public service
within this state.

(22) (a) "Sewerage corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any sewerage system
for public service within this state.
(b) "Sewerage corporation" does not include private sewerage companies engaged in
disposing of sewage only for their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, conservancy
districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under
any general or special law of this state.
(23) "Telegraph corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any telegraph line for
public service within this state.

(24) "Telegraph line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and
appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled,
operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate communication by telegraph,
whether that communication be had with or without the use of transmission wires.

(25)(a) "Telephone corporation" means any corporation or person, and their lessees,
trustee, receivers, or trustees appointed by any court, who owns, controls, operates,
manages, or resells a public telecommunications service as defined in Section 54-8b-2.
(b) "Telephone corporation" does not mean a corporation, partnership, or firm providing:
(i) intrastate telephone service offered by a provider of cellular, personal communication
systems (PCS), or other commercial mobile radio service as defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec.
332 that has been issued a covering license by the Federal Communications Commission;
(ii) Internet service; or
(iii) resold intrastate toll service.
(26) "Telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and
appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled,
operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone
whether that communication is had with or without the use of transmission wires.

(27) "Transportation of persons" includes every service in connection with or incidental
to the safety, comfort, or convenience of the person transported, and the receipt, carriage,
and delivery of that person and that person's baggage.

(28) "Transportation of property" includes every service in connection with or incidental
to the transportation of property, including in particular its receipt, delivery, elevation,
transfer, switching, carriage, ventilation, refrigeration, icing, dunnage, storage, and
hauling, and the transmission of credit by express companies.

(29) "Water corporation" includes every corporation and persdn, their lessees, trustees,
and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public
service within this state. It does not include private irrigation companies engaged in
distributing water only to their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, water conservancy
districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units cteated or organized under
any general or special law of this state.

(30)(a) "Water system" includes all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, headgates,
pipes, flumes, canals, structures, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and
personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to
facilitate the diversion, development, storage, supply, distribution, sale, furnishing,
carriage, appointment, apportionment, or measurement of water for power, fire
protection, irrigation, reclamation, or manufacturing, or for mtinicipal, domestic, or other
beneficial use.
(b) "Water system" does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing
water only to their stockholders.
(31) "Wholesale electrical cooperative" includes every electrical corporation that is:
(a) in the business of the wholesale distribution of electricity it has purchased or
generated to its members and the public; and
(b) required to distribute or allocate savings in excess of additions to reserves and surplus
to members or patrons on the basis of patronage.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 2, § 1; Laws 1925, c. 12, § 1; Laws 1948, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 7, § 1;
Laws 1957, c. 106, § 1; Laws 1959, c. 94, § 1; Laws 1965, c. 106, § 1; Laws 1969, c.
153, § 1; Laws 1984, c. 50, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 97, § 1; Laws }985, c. 98, § 1; Laws 1985,
c. 180, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 188, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 253, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 13; Laws
1986, c. 194, § 8; Laws 1986, c. 215, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 227, § 1;
Laws 1995, c. 173, § 3, eff. May 1,1995; Laws 1995, c. 316, § 6, eff. March 21,1995;
Laws 1996, c. 170, § 47, eff. July 1,1996; Laws 2000, c. 55, § 1, eff. May 1,2000; Laws
2001, c. 212, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2008, c. 374, § 7, eff. Mar. 18, 2008.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4782; R.S. 1933 § 76-2-1; C. 1943, § 76-2-1.
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U.C.A. 1953§54-4 : 1
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities
# § 54-4-1. General jurisdiction

The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate
every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public
utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in
addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction; provided, however, that the Department of Transportation shall have
jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of
Transportation Act. [FN1]
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 4, § 1; Laws 1975,1st Sp.Sess., c. 9, § J5.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4798; R.S. 1933, § 76-4-1; C. 1943, § 76-4-1.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 63G-3-301
Formerly cited as UT ST § 63-46a-4
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 63 G. General Government
Chapter 3. Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act (Refs & Anrios)
Part 3. Rulemaking Procedures
•*§ 63G-3-301. Rulemaking procedure

(1) An agency authorized to make rules is also authorized to afaiend or repeal those rules.

(2) Except as provided in Sections 63G-3-303 and 63G-3-304, when making, amending,
or repealing a rule agencies shall comply with:
(a) the requirements of this section;
(b) consistent procedures required by other statutes;
(c) applicable federal mandates; and
(d) rules made by the division to implement this chapter.
(3) Subject to the requirements of this chapter, each agency sfyall develop and use flexible
approaches in drafting rules that meet the needs of the agency and that involve persons
affected by the agency's rules.

(4)(a) Each agency shall file its proposed rule and rule analysis with the division.
(b) Rule amendments shall be marked with new language underlined and deleted
language struck out.
(c)(i) The division shall publish the information required under Subsection (8) on the rule
analysis and the text of the proposed rule in the next issue of the bulletin.
(ii) For rule amendments, only the section or subsection of the rule being amended need
be printed.
(iii) If the director determines that the rule is too long to publish, the director shall
publish the rule analysis and shall publish the rule by reference to a copy on file with the
division.
(5) Prior to filing a rule with the division, the department head shall consider and
comment on the fiscal impact a rule may have on businesses.

(6) If the agency reasonably expects that a proposed rule will have a measurable negative
fiscal impact on small businesses, the agency shall consider, as allowed by federal law,
each of the following methods of reducing the impact of the
on small businesses:

(a) establishing less stringent compliance or reporting requirements for small businesses;
(b) establishing less stringent schedules or deadlines for compliance or reporting
requirements for small businesses;
(c) consolidating or simplifying compliance or reporting requirements for small
businesses;
(d) establishing performance standards for small businesses to replace design or
operational standards required in the proposed rule; and
(e) exempting small businesses from all or any part of the requirements contained in the
proposed rule.
(7) If during the public comment period an agency receives comment that the proposed
rule will cost small business more than one day's annual average gross receipts, and the
agency had not previously performed the analysis in Subsection (6), the agency shall
perform the analysis described in Subsection (6).

(8) The rule analysis shall contain:
(a) a summary of the rule or change;
(b) the purpose of the rule or reason for the change;
(c) the statutory authority or federal requirement for the rule;
(d) the anticipated cost or savings to:
(i) the state budget;
(ii) local governments;
(iii) small businesses; and
(iv) persons other than small businesses, businesses, or local governmental entities;
(e) the compliance cost for affected persons;
(f) how interested persons may review the full text of the rule;
(g) how interested persons may present their views on the rule;
(h) the time and place of any scheduled public hearing;
(i) the name and telephone number of an agency employee who may be contacted about
the rule;
(j) the name of the agency head or designee who authorized the rule;
(k) the date on which the rule may become effective following the public comment
period; and
(1) comments by the department head on the fiscal impact the rule may have on
businesses.
(9)(a) For a rule being repealed and reenacted, the rule analysis shall contain a summary
that generally includes the following:
(i) a summary of substantive provisions in the repealed rule which are eliminated from
the enacted rule; and
(ii) a summary of new substantive provisions appearing only in the enacted rule.
(b) The summary required under this Subsection (9) is to aid in review and may not be
used to contest any rule on the ground of noncompliance with the procedural
requirements of this chapter.

(10) A copy of the rule analysis shall be mailed to all persons who have made timely
request of the agency for advance notice of its rulemaking proceedings and to any other
person who, by statutory or federal mandate or in the judgment of the agency, should also
receive notice.

(1 l)(a) Following the publication date, the agency shall allow at least 30 days for public
comment on the rule.
(b) The agency shall review and evaluate all public comments submitted in writing within
the time period under Subsection (1 l)(a) or presented at public hearings conducted by the
agency within the time period under Subsection (1 l)(a).
(12)(a) Except as provided in Sections 63G-3-303 and 63G-3-304, a proposed rule
becomes effective on any date specified by the agency that is no fewer than seven
calendar days after the close of the public comment period under Subsection (11), nor
more than 120 days after the publication date.
(b) The agency shall provide notice of the rule's effective date to the division in the form
required by the division.
(c) The notice of effective date may not provide for an effective date prior to the date it is
received by the division.
(d) The division shall publish notice of the effective date of tbe rule in the next issue of
the bulletin.
(e) A proposed rule lapses if a notice of effective date or a change to a proposed rule is
not filed with the division within 120 days of publication.
(13)(a) As used in this Subsection (13), "initiate rulemaking proceedings" means the
filing, for the purposes of publication in accordance with Subsection (4), of an agency's
proposed rule that is required by state statute.
(b) A state agency shall initiate rulemaking proceedings no later than 180 days after the
effective date of the statutory provision that specifically requires the rulemaking, except
under Subsection (13)(c).
(c) When a statute is enacted that requires agency rulemaking and the affected agency
already has rules in place that meet the statutory requirement, the agency shall submit the
rules to the Administrative Rules Review Committee for review within 60 days after the
statute requiring the rulemaking takes effect.
(d) If a state agency does not initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the time
requirements in Subsection (13)(b), the state agency shall appear before the legislative
Administrative Rules Review Committee and provide the reasons for the delay.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 300, § 2, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1360, eff. May 5,2008;
Laws 2009, c. 93, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws
2008, c. 300, § 2 and Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1360.
Prior Laws:
Laws 1985, c. 158, §1.
Laws 1987, c. 241, §3.
Laws 1991, c. 177, § 1.
Laws 1992, c. 146, § 1.
Laws 1996, c. 60, § 4.
Laws 1998, c. 219, §2.
Laws 2001, c. 138, § 5.
Laws 2005, c. 48, § 7.
Laws 2006, c. 141, § 1.
Laws 2007, c. 102, §2.
Laws 2007, c. 168, § 1.
C. 1953, § 63-46a-4.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 63G-4-4Q3
Formerly cited as UT ST § 63-46b-16
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 63G. General Government
Chapter 4. Administrative Procedures Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 4. Judicial Review
•*§ 63G-4-403. Judicial review—Formal adjudicative proceedings
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.

(2)(a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate
appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shah govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize
the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has
failed to follow prescribed procedure;

(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making
body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1393, eff. May 5, 2008.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
Laws 1987, c. 161, §272.
Laws 1988, c. 72, §26.
C. 1953, § 63-46b-16.
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R746-100-3. Pleadings.
A. Pleadings Enumerated—Applications, petitions, complaints, orders to show cause, and
other traditional initiatory pleadings may be filed with the Commission. Traditional
pleadings will be considered requests for agency action, pursuant to Section 63G-4-201,
concerning adjudicative proceedings. Answers, protests, and other traditional responsive
pleadings may be filed with the Commission and will be considered responses, subject to
the requirements of Section 63G-4-204.
1. The following filings are not requests for agency action or responses, pursuant to
Sections 63G-4-201 and 63G-4-204:
a. motions, oppositions, and similar filings in existing Commission proceedings;
b. informational filings which do not request or require affirmative action, such as
Commission approval.
B. Docket Number and Title—
1. Docket number—Upon the filing of an initiatory pleading, or upon initiation of a
generic proceeding, the Commission shall assign a docket number to the proceeding
which shall consist of the year in which the pleading was filed, a code identifying the
public utility appearing as applicant, petitioner, or respondent, or generic code
designation and another number showing its numerical position among the filings
involving the utility or generic proceeding filed during the yegr.
2. Headings and titles—Pleadings shall bear a heading substantially as follows:
TABLE
Name of Attorney preparing or Signer of Pleading
Address
Telephone Number
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH
In the Matter of the
Application, petition,
etc.—for complaints,
names of both complainant
and respondent should
appear

Docket Number
Type of pleading

C. Form of Pleadings—With the exception of consumer complaints, pleadings shall be
double-spaced and typewritten, which may include a computer or word processor, if the
type is easily legible and in the equivalent of at least 12 point type. Pleadings shall be
presented on paper 8-1/2 x 11 inches, shall include the docket number, if known, and
shall be dated and time stamped upon receipt by the Commission. Pleadings shall also be
presented as an electronic word processing document, an exact copy of the paper version
filed, and may be on a 3-1/2" floppy disk or compact disc (CD), using a Commissionapproved format. Pleadings over five pages shall be double sided and three-hole punched.
D. Amendments to Pleadings—The Commission may allow pleadings to be amended or
corrected at any time. Initiatory pleadings may be amended without leave of the
Commission at any time before a responsive pleading has been filed or the time for filing
the pleading has expired. Defects in pleadings which do not affect substantial rights of
the parties shall be disregarded.
E. Signing of Pleadings—Pleadings shall be signed by the party, or by the party's attorney
or other authorized representative if the party is represented by an attorney or other
authorized representative, and shall show the signer's address. The signature shall be
considered a certification by the signer that he has read the pleading and that, to the best
of his knowledge and belief, there is good ground to support it.
F. Consumer Complaints—
L Alternative dispute resolution, mediation procedures—Before a proceeding on a
consumer complaint is initiated before the Commission, the Commission shall try to
resolve the matter through referral first to the customer relations department, if any, of
the public utility complained of and then to the Division for investigation and mediation.
Only after these resolution efforts have failed will the Commission entertain a proceeding
on the matter.
2. Request for agency action—Persons requesting Commission action shall be required to
file a complaint in writing, requesting agency action. The Commission shall not act on
illegible or incomplete complaints and shall return those complaints to the complainant
with instructions for correction or completion.
3. The Division of Public Utilities may participate in a consumer complaint proceeding as
determined by the Division or as requested by the Commission.
G. Content of Pleadings—
1. Pleadings filed with the Commission shall include the following information as
applicable:

a. if known, the reference numbers, docket numbers, or other identifying symbols of
relevant tariffs, rates, schedules, contracts, applications, rules, or similar matter or
material;
b. the name of each participant for whom the filing is made or, if the filing is made for a
group of participants, the name of the group, if the name of each member of the group is
set forth in a previously filed document which is identified in the filing being made;
c. if statute, rule, regulation, or other authority requires the Coinmission to act within a
specific time period for a matter at issue, a specific section of the pleading, located after
the heading or caption, entitled "Proceeding Time Period," which shall include: reference
or citation to the statute, rule, regulation, or other authority; identification of the time
period; and the expiration date of the time period identified by day, month, and year
d. the specific authorization or relief sought;
e. copies of, or references to, tariff or rate sheets relevant to the pleading;
f. the name and address of each person against whom the complaint is directed;
g. the relevant facts, if not set forth in a previously filed document which is identified in
the filing being made;
h. the position taken by the participant filing a pleading, to thd extent known when the
pleading is filed, and the basis in fact and law for the position;
i. the name, address, and telephone number of an individual who, with respect to a matter
contained in the filing, represents the person for whom the filing is made;
j . additional information required to be included by Section 63G-4-201, concerning
commencement of adjudicative proceedings, or other statute, rule, or order.
H. Motions—Motions may be submitted for the Commission's decision on either written
or oral argument, and the filing of affidavits in support or contravention of the motion is
permitted. If oral argument is sought, the party seeking oral argument shall arrange a
hearing date with the Commission's Law and Motion calendar and provide at least five
days written notice to affected parties, unless the Commission determines a shorter time
period is needed.
I. Responsive Pleadings—
1. Responsive pleadings to applications, petitions, or requests for agency action shall be
filed in accordance with Section 63G-4-204.
2. Response and reply pleadings may be filed to pleadings other than applications,
petitions or requests for agency action.
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U.A.C.R746-331
Utah Admin. R. 746-331
Utah Administrative Code Currentness
Public Service Commission
R746. Administration.
R746-331. Determination of Exemption of Mutual Water Corporations.
R746-331-1. Conditions for Finding of Exemption.
A. Upon the Commission's own motion, complaint of a person, or request of an entity
desiring a finding of exemption, the Commission may undertake an inquiry to determine
whether an entity organized as a mutual, non-profit corporation, furnishing culinary
water, is outside the Commission's jurisdiction.
B. In conducting the inquiry, the Commission shall elicit information from the subject of
the inquiry concerning:
1. the organizational form of the entity and its compliance status with the Utah Division
of Corporations;
2. ownership and control of assets necessary to furnish culinary water service, including
water sources and plant;
3. ownership and voting control of the entity. To elicit this information, the Commission
may adopt a questionnaire asking for the information in form and in detail that the
Commission shall find necessary to make its jurisdictional determination; the
questionnaire may include a requirement that documentation be furnished therewith,
including copies of articles of incorporation, and effective amendments thereto, filed with
the Utah Division of Corporations and certified by that agency, together with a certificate
of good standing therewith.
C. If, on the basis of the information elicited, the Commission finds that the entity is an
existing non-profit corporation, in good standing with the Division of Corporations; that
the entity owns or otherwise adequately controls the assets necessary to furnish culinary
water service to its members, including water sources and plant; and that voting control
of the entity is distributed in a way that each member enjoys a complete commonality of
interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be superfluous, then the
Commission shall issue its finding that the entity is exempt from Commission
jurisdiction, and the proceeding shall end. Issuance of the finding shall not preclude
another Commission inquiry at a later time if changed circumstances or later-discovered
facts warrant another inquiry.
D. If, on the basis of the information elicited, the Commission determines that the entity
is subject to Commission jurisdiction, the Commission shall initiate the proceedings,

including an Order to Show Cause, as shall be necessary to assert Commission
jurisdiction.
KEY: mutual water corporations*, public utilities, water
April 6, 1998
Notice of Continuation April 1, 2008
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH In the Matter of the Formal Complaint of
Nicole McMillian et al vs. Wilkinson
Cottonwood Mutual Water Company

DOCKET NO. 09-019-01
ORDER

ISSUED: February 22, 2010
By The Commission:
This matter is before the Commission on Wilkinson Cottonwood Mutual Water
Company's (Company) Motion to Dismiss Nicole McMillian's fortnal complaint against the
Company.
Ms. McMillian filed her formal complaint on or about December 14, 2009. She
asks the Commission to investigate the Company and find that jurisdiction exists to regulate the
Company. In support of her complaint, she makes several allegations in support of a
Commission investigation and eventual jurisdiction. She states, in part, that the Company "has
failed to issues shares to its members or to hold a meeting of its shareholders . . . .", Complaint,
p.2, has "yet to issue shares to its members and has not held a shareholder meeting allowing its
members to vote

" Id. at p.3. Additionally, Ms. McMillian states the "Company is currently

obligated to provide both indoor culinary and outdoor irrigation water to over 200 homes and is
obligated to provide water service to an existing elementary school." Id. at p.4.
On January 11, 2010, the Company filed a Motion io Dismiss, moving the
Commission to dismiss the complaint. It claims that because it serves only its members, and
because it "does not hold itself out as serving the public generally," Memo. Supp. Motion to
Dismiss, p.3, it is not a public utility and not subject to Commission jurisdiction. Alternatively,

DOCKET NO. 09-019-01
-2it states the complaint must be dismissed because the Company qualifies for, and has been
granted, an exemption from regulation pursuant to R746-331-1.
When considering the Motion to Dismiss and in ascertaining the facts needed to
establish jurisdiction, the Commission must '"accept the factual allegations in the complaint as
true and consider all reasonable inference to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff.'" Ho v. Jim's Enters., 2001 UT 63, H 6 (quoting Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764,766
(Utah 1991)). When jurisdiction is at issue, the Commission "under Rule 12, . . . may determine
jurisdiction on affidavits alone, permit discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing." Anderson v.
American Socy of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990).
Here the parties dispute a key allegation upon which Commission jurisdiction lies.
The complaint, on its face, alleges the Company "has failed to issues shares to its members" and
"yet to issue shares to its members" and is providing water to "over 200 homes and is obligated
to provide water service to an existing elementary school." The Commission must determine if
any of the 200 homes or the existing elementary school, or any other party, receives water
without being issued any share in the Company. That is—whether the Company serves those
who are not members, and could be considered members of the general public.
ORDER
The Commission will decline to rule on the Motion at this time pending a limited
investigation by the Division of Public Utilities (Division) to determine if the Company serves
those who are not shareholders. The Division has 30 days from the issuance of this Order to
issue its findings to the Commission. The parties shall cooperate with the Division in conducting

DOCKET NO. 09-019-01
-3its investigation, included answering data requests. If the Division requires more time to conduct
its investigation, it may move for an extension of time. After the investigation is concluded and
once the findings are filed, the Commission will set an evidentiary hearing to determine if the
complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 22nd day of February, 2010.
Is/ Ruben H. Arredondo
Administrative Law Judge
Attest:
/s/ Julie Orchard
Commission Secretary
G#65325
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Petition for and Order )
to Show Cause Regarding Exemption from )
Commission Regulation of Boulder King
)
Ranch Estates Water Company
)

DOCKET NO. 02-2254-01
AMENDED REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED: October 16, 2002
By the Commission:
On application of the Division of Public Utilities, this Commission isfeued an Order to Show Cause why
the letter of Exemption granted to Boulder King Ranch Estates Water Company ("Boulder King" of the
"Company") should not be revoked and its rates and conditions of service be subject to the Orders and
Administrative Rules adopted by this Commission. Hearings were held in Boulder, Utah. The Division
of Public Utilities, through Wes Huntsman, offered testimony and examined witnesses. Boulder King,
represented by Barry E. Clarkson, also offered testimony and examined witnesses. Numerous customers
of the Company also offered sworn testimony. The Company and theiDivision also filed post-hearing
briefs. Being fully advised, we enter the following:
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
1. Boulder King Ranch Estates is a subdivision currently comprised of 61 lots. It was created in 1966.
In the early 1980fs Mr. Dale Clarkson purchased and assumed control of the subdivision development.
Title to the unsold lots was transferred to a retirement trust for Mr. Clarkson. Over the years some of the
original lots have been sold, some with the promise of culinary water and some with no promise of
water ("dry lots").
2. Beginning in 1989, Dale Clarkson began assessing dry lot owners $2,000 for an "Improvement
Package" which included provisioning water and power service to the lots. In 1994, Mr. Clarkson
increased the cost of the Improvement Package to $2,500. Some owners of dry lots paid for the
Improvement Package. Many dry lot owners had not requested water or power hookups and refused to
pay for the Improvement Package. Mr. Clarkson, on behalf of the Company, also began accruing interest
on unpaid assessments for the Improvement Package.
3. Boulder King Ranch Estates Water Company was formed in 1993. Dale Clarkson, his son Larry
Clarkson, and Keith Gailey were appointed to the board of the Company. At the time, Larry Clarkson
did not own a lot in the subdivision. He was later given a lot in exchange for work done installing parts
of the water system. Mr. Clarkson provided or promised to provide shares in the Company to lot owners
that had purchased lots with a promise of water rights, or had paid for the Improvement Package. Mr.
Clarkson, on behalf of the Company, began charging a $5 per month standby fee for lots not hooked up
to the system, and $15 per month for water usage to lots where hookups had occurred. Mr. Clarkson, on
behalf of the Company, also began accruing interest at the rate of 18% on unpaid improvement
packages, standby, and monthly usage fee balances. Further "improvements" were done in 2000 and
2001 by Mr. Clarkson without prior approval of the lot owners, watei* company members, or the
Company board. Mr. Clarkson, on behalf of the Company, began billing some lot owners $3,900 or

$5,900 for this second "Improvement Package" that included the cost of installing telephone lines to the
lots, widening, grading and graveling roads in the subdivision, improving paths and trails, and fencing
the subdivision. Mr. Clarkson also began accruing interest on these assessments at the rate of 18%.
Several lot owners objected to paying for the improvements that they claim were never asked for,
authorized, or wanted.
4. In 1994 the Company was notified by the Utah Department of Environmental Quality that it was not
in compliance with applicable rules regarding its water system. Other administrative actions were taken
by the DEQ against the Company, including issuance of an order in 1996 finding the water system
unapproved. After further administrative actions, the Division of Drinking Water ("DDW") approved
plans for expansion of the system and an operating permit for the well serving the system in September
2001. On May 1, 2002, as a result of failure to comply with monitoring and testing requirements, the
DDW downgraded the Boulder King water system to "Not Approved." On May 29, 2002, the DDW
changed the classification of the Boulder King system to "non-public" for monitoring, quality, reporting,
and operator certification requirements. The change was due to the number of connections currently
being served. The "Not Approved" rating was also removed, and the system is now unrated.
5. In May 1998, the Division of Public Utilities filed a Petition for an Order to Show Cause against
Dale Clarkson and Boulder King for operating a public utility without proper authority. Boulder King
resisted regulation. The Division agreed to recommend that the Company be issued a Letter of
Exemption. On April 19, 1999, a Letter of Exemption was issued to Boulder King.
6. Following complaints from numerous customers of Boulder King, the Division again investigated the
Company and started this proceeding with a Petition for an Order to Show Cause as to why the letter of
exemption should not be revoked.
Boulder King challenges the ability of this Commission to exercise its regulatory powers over the
Company. Boulder King recognizes this Commission's ability to regulate public utilities, but claims that
it is not a public utility. Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 (15)(a) defines a public utility as:
"Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation,
distribution electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative, telephone corporation,
water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent energy
producer not described in Subsection (15)(d), where the service is performed for, or the
commodity delivered to, the public generally . . .
Subsection 27 of that same section defines the term "water corporation" as follows:
"Water corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and
receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service
within this state. It does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing
water only to their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, water conservancy districts,
improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any general
or special law of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(27).
The term "water system" is defined in section 54-2-28(a). Then section 54-2-28(b) states:
"Water system" does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water

only to their stockholders.
Boulder King claims that because it is a nonprofit corporation which Serves only its owning members
with each lot having one vote, that it is not a "public utility." We disagree. Boulder King falls within the
definition of a public utility. It is a water corporation that owns, controls, operates, or manages a water
system for public service within this state. The fact that it is a nonprofit corporation owned by the
owners of lots in the Boulder Kings Ranch Estates subdivision does not cause it to be exempt from
regulation. The statutes set forth above that define "water corporation" and "water system" do exempt
from regulation systems engaged in distribution of irrigation water to their stockholders. There is no
similar exemption for culinary systems.
Boulder King further claims that it does not serve the public as required by statute. Boulder King relies
on Garkane Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comiru 98 Utah 466, 100 P.2d 571 (1940). That reliance is
misplaced. The Garkane court held that Garkane Power was not a public utility because it only served its
members, and it was able to choose who would be a member. It therefore did not serve the general
public. The court's reasoning in coming to that conclusion is applicable to this case. The Garkane court
said:
The distinction between a public service corporation and a cooperative is a qualitative one.
In a cooperative the principle of mutuality of ownership among all users is substituted for
the conflicting interests that dominate the owner vendor—non owner vendee relationship. In
a cooperative all sell to each. The owner is both seller and buydr. So long as a cooperative
serves only its owner-members and so long as it has the right to select those who become
members, ordinarily it matters not that 5 or 1000 people are members or that a few or all the
people in a given area are accorded membership, provided the arrangement is a bona fide
cooperative or private service organization and is not a device prepared and operated to
evade or circumvent the law. The courts will always scrutinize closely to determine whether
or not a certain organization or method of conduct has for its purpose evasion of the law,
and where it finds such evasion will declare such organization to be what it truly is.
Id. at 573. The court further stated:
It is conceded that "the public" does not mean all of the people in the state or in any county
or town. "The public" is a term used to designate individuals in general without restriction
or selection. A service organization which holds itself out to sejve all who wish to avail
themselves of its services might be a public utility even though only one or two people
actually receive service.
Id. at 574.
At the hearing on this matter representatives of Boulder King agreed that it did not have the ability to
choose its members. Lot owners in the subdivision are, by virtue of their lot ownership, members.
Boulder King representatives further stated that every person or entity that purchases a lot is entitled
service from the Company. Boulder King cannot choose its members as required by the Garkane
decision, and is obligated to serve the public within its service area.^
The reasoning of the Garkane decision is incorporated into Commission rule R746-331, Determination
of Exemption of Mutual Water Corporations. Boulder King fails to m^et at least two of the requirements
of that rule.

For exemption from regulation, Rule 331 requires inquiry into the ownership or control of assets
necessary to furnish culinary water service. The Division testified that it had been unable to verify that
sufficient water rights had been transferred to the Company, or that the well, pump, tank, and
distribution line facilities were owned by the Company. The Company did not offer evidence
contradicting the Division's findings, and this issue remains unresolved.
More troubling in this case is the required inquiry into ownership and voting control of the entity. The
facts in this matter clearly show that the developer, Dale Clarkson, has maintained control over this
entity, to the detriment of customers, and possibly the Company itself.
The letter of exemption previously granted to Boulder King was based on the representation that Mr.
Clarkson would not and could not exercise control over the Company. Prior to issuance of the Letter of
Exemption, the By-Laws of Boulder King were amended to state: "The Developer shall be limited to
one (1) vote for control purposes as it relates to policy making and managing the affairs of the
company." The Company, and Mr. Clarkson, further represented to the Commission that title to the
unsold lots in the subdivision had been transferred to an IRA Trust Account. Based on those
representations the Division recommended that the Company be granted a Letter of Exemption, and a
Letter of Exemption was granted.
The representations upon which that letter was granted, however, were false. Boulder King customers
testified that at least two meetings of the Company Mr. Clarkson stated that he was prepared to vote
proxy votes for the shares held in the IRA Trust Account. Those votes together with the one vote for the
lot titled in Mr. Clarkson's name were enough to allow Mr. Clarkson to control the Company.^ Mr.
Clarkson admitted that the trustees of the IRA Trust Account have a fiduciary responsibility to him, and
that he directs the disposition of the proceeds from the sale of lots. The Division testified, and we so
find, that Mr. Clarkson continues to have control over the voting of the shares held by the IRA Trust
Account. Contrary to his representation that he would have only one vote, Mr. Clarkson has continued to
exercise control over the votes for the lots held in the Trust, and has exercised effective control over the
Company.
Recently an amendment to the Company By-Laws was placed for a vote of the shareholders. The
amendment would take away the voting right of any customer that is not current on all bills and
assessments. A vote was cast for each of the lots held in the IRA Trust Account and the proposed
amendment passed 35 to 6. This provision further eliminates any commonality of interest of the
customers. That this provision disenfranchises customers that have not paid for improper assessments, as
discussed below, is particularly troublesome.
Mr. Clarkson's control has engendered numerous problems with the Company that must be addressed.
He recently took out a loan in the amount of $50,977.10 in the name of Boulder King Ranch Estates
Water Company without authorization from the Company. Customers of the company have also been
mistreated. In response to a request for information Mr. Clarkson told one customer that if he wanted the
information he would have to pay $2 per page for copies of the relevant documents. Mr. Clarkson also
sent letters to other utilities encouraging them not to serve residents of Boulder King Ranch Estates until
those customers had paid all billings from Mr. Clarkson. And in what must be seen as scare tactics, Mr.
Clarkson also sent letters to Boulder King customers stating that if the Company were regulated by this
Commission, rates would be as high as $150 per month.
Most serious, however, is Mr. Clarkson's attempt to use the water company to collect "Improvement
Packages." In 1989, Mr. Clarkson assessed dry lot owners $2,000 which included placing water and
power to the subdivision lots. In July 2000, Mr. Clarkson, on behalf of the Company, began billing lot

owners either $5,900 or $3,900 (depending on whether the owner had previously obtained a water right)
for another "Improvement Package" that included installing telephone lines to the lots in the subdivision;
widening, grading and graveling roads; improving paths and trails, and fencing the subdivision. These
packages were nothing more than an attempt by Mr. Clarkson to pass development costs onto current lot
owners through his control of the water company. At the hearing, the Company's attorney conceded that
the Company lacked the legal authority to make such assessments, bcith as a water corporation and under
its Articles of Incorporation. The Company also agreed, during the hearing, to refrain from attempting to
collect on any such assessments until this matter is resolved.
Unfortunately Mr. Clarkson was successful in collecting assessments from some customers. The issue of
whether, and if so how, refunds should be made to such customers will need to be addressed. We will
order the Company to provide all information regarding payments for assessments made by customers to
the Commission and the Division of Public Utilities. All parties are also directed to address this issue in
their testimony and recommendations for the hearings set below.
The history of this company demonstrates a serious failure of the officers to properly manage the
company, and to protect the interests of customers. The Company, Mr. Clarkson in particular, has
exhibited a pattern of withholding information, using the company for private gain, making improper
and groundless statements to customers and other utilities, and in general showing little concern for the
interests of customers. The facts of this matter show that regulation is not superfluous. On the contrary,
the facts indicate the absolute necessity of regulating this particular water corporation.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Letter of Exemption previously granted to Boulder King was granted based upon false premises
and must be rescinded.
2. The Company does not qualify for exemption from regulation by this Commission. Regulation by
this Commission is not only proper, but necessary.
3. Further proceedings are necessary to set rates and conditions of service, and to address the possible
refund of previously paid improper assessments.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that:
1. The Letter of Exemption granted to Boulder King Ranch Estates Water Company is rescinded, and
the Company is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of this Commission.
2. Boulder King may not collect assessments for any Improvement Packages, or interest thereon. All
other rates and charges of the Company are to remain the same pending the further proceedings set
herein.
3. Boulder King is to provide to the Division of Public Utilities and this Commission all information it
has regarding customers that have paid assessments, including the dates of each payment, and any
interest accrued and/or paid by each customer.
4. Further proceedings will be held to set the rates and conditions of Service for Boulder King. The
schedule for those proceedings is as follows:

a. On November 22, 2002, the Division of Public Utilities shall file testimony and exhibits updating its
previous testimony in this matter, and proposing rates and conditions of service for the Company.
b. On December 20, 2002, Boulder King will file its testimony and exhibits regarding the rates and
conditions of service of the Company.
c. If the Division wishes to file responsive testimony, it will do so by January 3, 2002.
d. Hearings will be conducted by the Administrative Law Judge of the Public Service Commission of
Utah on Tuesday, January 7, 2003, beginning at 9:00 a.m., in the Fourth Floor Hearing Room #451,
Heber M. Wells State Office building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. All parties have the
right to be represented by legal counsel. Failure to bring legal counsel will constitute a waiver of the
right to representation.
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals needing special accommodations
(including auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this hearing should notify Julie Orchard,
Commission Secretary, at 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, (801) 530-6713, at least
three working days prior to the hearing.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of October, 2002.
/s/ Douglas C. Tingey
Administrative Law Judge
Approved and Confirmed this 16th day of October, 2002, as the Report and Order of the Public Service
Commission of Utah.
/s/ Stephen F. Mecham, Chairman
I si Constance B. White, Commissioner
/s/ Richard M. Campbell, Commissioner
Attest:
/s/ Julie Orchard
Commission Secretary
G#31256

1. As stated above, some of the lots in Boulder King Ranch Estates were sold as "dry lots" with no
promise of water. The Company has, however, sent bills to the dry lot owners. By its actions the
Company has shown that it considers those lots within its service territory and obligation.
2. The Company's brief discusses whether Mr. Clarkson had control over his son, and therefore his vote
in company affairs. Because Mr. Clarksonfs voting the Trust shares itself constitutes a violation of the
basis of the granting of the letter of exemption, and the fact that Mr. Clarkson's voting block is large
enough for him to have effective control of the company, we do not need to address that issue. We do
find it significant with respect to Mr. Clarkson's control of the Company that it was Mr. Clarkson's son
that installed some or all of the water system in exchange for a lot from Mr. Clarkson.
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Investigation of
the Water System Operations of
DANIELS SUMMIT ESTATES
WATER COMPANY for Certification
as a Public Utility or Exemption as a
[Mutual Water Company

DOCKET NO. 04-2436-01

NOTICE OF HEARING AND
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

ISSUED: August 3, 2004
By the Commission:

On July 27, 2004, the Division of Public Utilities (Division) filed a Petition, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §54-4a-l, for an Order to Show Cause why Daniels Summit Estates Water
Company (Daniels Summit or Company) should not be fined $2,000 per day for each day that the
Company has operated as a private water utility delivering culinary water to customers without the
Commission authority required by statute, and why its named officer, Brent Hill, should not face the
criminal sanctions provided by statute. The Division's petition alleges that representatives of the Utah
Division of Public Drinking Water have notified it that the Company is currently serving culinary water
customers.

In response to a letter sent to Daniels Summit in September 2003, the Company, on
October 17, 2003, sent the Division a survey form indicating that the Company serves 11 households.
On October 17, 2003, the Division sent the Company a letter requesting completion of an enclosed
application for exemption from Commission regulation. On February 6,2004, the Division sent a second
letter by certified mail and received a return receipt signed by Deanne Hill. On April 30,2004, counsel

for the Division sent a letter to the Company providing notice of its intention to petition the Commission
for an order to show cause and received a return receipt signed by Elizabeth Lehner. On May 13, 2004, a
member of the Division staff spoke to Brent Hill by telephone and sent him another copy of the
application form. To date, the Company has not filed an application for exemption.

The Division's Petition sets forth good cause for an inquiry into whether Daniels Summit
should be fined, and its named officer required to face criminal sanctions, for failure to comply with
UCA § 54-4-25 requiring a certificate of public convenience and necessity prior to utility operation. A
copy of the Division's Petition is attached hereto, and incorporated by this reference. Whereas there
appears to be good cause to support said allegations, the Commission enters the following order.

ORDER

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that:

DANIELS SUMMIT ESTATES WATER COMPANY and its officers, shall appear
before the Administrative Law Judge of the Commission on Tuesday, August 17, 2004, at 9:30 a.m., in
the Fourth Floor Hearing Room #451, Heber M. Wells State Office Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, to show cause, if any, why Daniels Summit Estates Water Company has operated as a
public utility without a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and further to show cause why
the Company should not be fined for operating without a certificate, and other remedies imposed on the
Company and its named officers.

2.

The Division of Public Utilities shall conduct such further investigation as it deems

necessary and provide any additional recommendations at the hearing. The Division is further directed

to send a copy of this Notice, and a copy of the Petition, without attachments, to each property owner
served or potentially to be served by the Company, according to the most current information in the
possession of the Division.

3.

DANIELS SUMMIT ESTATES WATER COMPANY and its officers are directed to

cooperate with the Division and provide information requested by the Division in its investigation of the
Company.

4.

DANIELS SUMMIT ESTATES WATER COMPANY customers who will not be

present for the hearing may participate by telephone. Customers wishing to participate by telephone
should notify Julie Orchard, Commission Secretary, at least one day prior to the hearing at 801-5306716.

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals needing special
accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this hearing should
notify Julie Orchard, Commission Secretary, at 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, (801)
530-6713, at least three working days prior to the hearing.

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 3 r d day of August, 2004.
Isi Ric Campbell Chairman
Isi Constance B. White, (pommissioner
Is/ Ted Boyer, Commissioner
Attest:
Isl Julie Orchard

Commission Secretary
G#39642

-ATTACHMENTPATRICIA E. SCHMID (#4908)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666)
Attorney General of Utah
Counsel for the DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
160 E 300 S, 5 th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
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PETITION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
July 27, 2004
Pursuant to Commission Rule R746-100-3, the Division of Public Utilities ("Division") hereby
submits its petition for an Order to Show Cause against Daniels Summit Estates Water Company
("Company"), and its officer, Brent Hill. The Division petitions the Utah Public Service Commission
pursuant to UCA § 54-4a-l, to open a docket for the purpose of requiring the named principal of the
Company to explain why the Company has been operating a water system as a public utility without a

certificate of convenience and necessity, and to show cause why the Company should not be fined
$2,000 per day for each day that the Company has not been in compliance with Public Utility Statutes
and why the named principal should not face criminal sanctions provided by statute.

In support of the petition, the Division submits:

1.

In July, 2003, the Division received a listing of Public Water Systems from the Utah Division of
Drinking Water which indicated that the Company operated Water System Number 26071 in
Wasatch County. The listing indicated that the system was approved in May, 1999 for a
maximum of 60 culinary water connections.

2.

In response to a letter sent to the Company by the Division in September, 2003, a Company
representative filed a survey form on October 17, 2003, indicating that the mutual water
company served 11 households (See Attachment #1).

3.

On October 17, 2003, the Division sent a letter to the designated Company contact Brent Hill at
the address listed on the survey response, PO Box 490 Heber City, UT, requesting completion of
an enclosed application for exemption from Public Service Commission Regulation and provide
the necessary information for the Division to determine whether the Company was operating the
water system as a mutual culinary water company or needed to be certificated as a public utility
(See Attachment # 2).

4.

On February 6, 2004, the Division sent a second letter by certified mail to the designated
Company contact requesting completion of an application. Th0 Division received a return receipt
signed by Deanne Hill indicating that the letter was delivered (See Attachment # 3).

5.

On April 30, 2004, the Assistant Attorney General representing the Division sent the Company a
certified letter to Brent Hill at the same address providing a: "Notice of Intention to file a petition
for an order to show cause for failure to respond to requests for information and for operation of
a public utility without a certificate of convenience and necessity." The Division received a
return receipt signed by Elizabeth Lehner indicating that the letter was delivered (See
Attachment # 4). Wesley Huntsman from the Division staff talked to Brent Hill by telephone
about the application on May 13, 2004 and sent him another copy of the blank application form
at his request. However, to date the Company has not filed for an exemption.

6.

Pursuant to UCA § 54-4-1, the Commission is empowered to supervise and regulate public
utilities providing service within Utah. Under UCA § 54-4a-l (c), the Division is empowered to,
"investigate or study, upon complaint, upon order of the Public Service Commission, or upon its
own initiative, any matter within the jurisdiction of the commission."

7.

UCA § 54-4-25, provides that: "A . . . water corporation, or sewerage corporation may not
establish, or begin construction or operation of a line, route, plant, or system or any extension of
a line, route, plant, or system, without having first obtained from the commission a certificate
that present or future public convenience and necessity does or will require the construction ."

8.

Administrative Rule R746-331-1 provides that "Upon the Commission's own motion, complaint
of a person, or request of an entity desiring a finding of exemption, the Commission may
undertake an inquiry to determine whether an entity organized as a mutual, non-profit
corporation, furnishing culinary water, is outside the Commission's jurisdiction."

9.

Pursuant to UCA § 54-7-25, any public utility that fails to comply with the statute, any rule or
order issued by the Commission is subject to a penalty of not less than $500 nor more than
$2,000 for each offense. The statute also states that in circumstances where violations are of a
continuing nature, each day's continuance of the violation shall be a separate and distinct
offense.

10.

Pursuant to UCA § 54-7-26 and 28, any officer or agent of the Company, or other individual who
either individually, or acting as an officer agent or employee of a corporation other than the
public utility, violates any provision of the statute is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

Wherefore, the Division respectfully requests that the Commission open a docket for the purpose
of requiring the Company, its officers and its agents to appear and show cause why the water company
and the named individual should not be sanctioned for failing to comply with applicable statutes. The
Division recommends that failing an adequate cause showing, the Coipmission should impose the
maximum fine of $2,000 per incident and find the individual guilty of numerous violations.

Based upon the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Division petitions the Commission to
open a docket and request that the Company, and Brent Hill appear before the Commission and show
cause why fines should not be imposed upon the Company for failure to comply with the referenced
Statutes.

Dated this ^ d a y of July, 2004.
/s/ Patricia E. Schmid
Assistant Attorney General
Division of Publip Utilities

